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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every day, children in classrooms across the country are told they 
must stand and recite the pledge of allegiance in unwitting violation of 
the First Amendment.1 Meanwhile, in cafeterias from Kansas to 
California, children forego their own quiet prayers, believing even 
private prayer in school to be prohibited.2 Police officers stop citizens 
and ask for their consent to searches and interrogations.3 Many say yes 
because they do not believe they can say no.4 People jaywalk, adversely 
possess, claim exemptions, and refuse to pay their taxes because they 
dubiously believe they can legally do so.5 Merchants write and people 
sign contracts without the remotest idea whether the terms are 
enforceable or whether the oral promises they exchange have changed 
it.6 Even in run-of-the-mill litigation, experienced commercial litigators 
and criminal lawyers routinely argue over discovery rights, enlargements 
of time, and the meaning of words like “jurisdiction,” “unfairness,” and 
the “interests of justice.” They do not always do this because they are 
villainous law abusers. Often, they do it because they sincerely disagree 
about what the law requires. 
Yet, lawyers, laymen, law professors, and legal scholars often insist 
that “there is massive and pervasive agreement about the law throughout 
the system.”7 These claims are frequent and seldom carefully examined. 
1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
2. See John M. Swomley, Myths About Voluntary School Prayer, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 294,
297 (1996). 
3. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
4. Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience
Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 233 
(1997) (“The most baffling aspect of the Supreme Court’s conception of voluntary consent is that it 
virtually ignores the well-documented observation that most people mechanically obey legitimate 
authority.”); see also People v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he greatest 
legal fiction of the late 20th Century . . . .”). 
5. Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2229, 2232 (2013) (explaining
the concept of “shallow signals” in which “the law’s design may contribute to . . . misperception, 
and in which . . . misguided imitation [of conduct that is legal for A] results in illegal conduct [by 
B].”). 
6. Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral
Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 57 (2013) (“The . . . 
Problem exists on the border between contract and tort law, creating confusion for courts and 
leading to inconsistent rulings.”). 
7. Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1227
(2009). (“[T]here is massive and pervasive agreement about the law throughout the system.”); id. at 
1228 (“To be sure, we must concede the obvious: massive agreement about the law—not 
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Nevertheless, when it is insisted that there is widespread agreement 
about the law, it is often unclear what that means. Is it agreement about 
what is illegal? As in, what laws there are and what they prohibit or 
allow? Is it agreement about how to find out if something is illegal? As 
in, what sources you might look to, or how you might reason about those 
sources? Is it a prediction about what will happen in a case, what 
conduct will be scrutinized, or what cases will be brought? 
If the question was put to you, and I claimed that there was massive 
and pervasive agreement about the law, what would you think I meant 
by that? How would you understand whether it was a true statement? If 
it was a true statement, what would it mean for theories of law and 
adjudication? This last question is especially interesting, because in the 
eyes of many Legal Positivists, the existence of massive agreement 
strikes a decisive blow in favor of that theory.8 
This Article grapples with the question of what it means to agree 
about what the law is.  First, it shows that the question of what it means 
to “agree about the law” invites us to consider many different kinds of 
agreement and disagreement we might have about what the law is. 
Second, it shows that without selecting one of these kinds of agreement, 
we cannot speak intelligibly about whether we agree or disagree. Third, 
it explains that this failure to choose is a source of much confusion and 
apparent disagreement between competing philosophers and 
philosophies of law. Fourth, it argues that the presence or absence of at 
least certain kinds of agreement cannot tell us whether we should prefer 
Legal Positivism or other theories of law. Finally, it concludes that the 
pervasive reliance among Positivists on a generalized notion that there 
exists “massive agreement” about the law should be regarded 
disagreement—is the norm in modern legal systems.”); id. at 1231 (“At the base of the pyramid, 
ordinary language and ordinary meaning hold sway, which, together with the convergence of 
officials on criteria of legal validity, render most cases clear and produce massive agreement in 
legal judgments.”); see also Brian Leiter, Why Legal Positivism (Again)?, 11 (U. Chi. Law Sch. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 442, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323013 (“[T]here exists massive agreement about what the law is in the 
vast, vast majority of legal questions that arise in ordinary life. If there were not massive agreement 
on the law, then every modern legal system would collapse under the weight of the disputes that 
resulted.”); John Oberdiek, Specifying Constitutional Rights, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 231, 246 (2010) 
(reviewing GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF 
RIGHTS (2009)) (“As a general matter, no one should deny that there is widespread agreement about 
the law. . . .”); Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA. L. REV. 801, 839 (2012) 
(“[There is] widespread agreement about law’s constraints . . . .”); Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, 
Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1029 (1994) (“[O]ur legal 
system presently contains enough clear rules to allow us to govern our day-to-day behavior. . . .”). 
8. See, e.g., Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1227; Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 413 (1985). 
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skeptically. 
II. WHY TALK ABOUT LEGAL AGREEMENT?
Why should we be concerned with the concept of legal agreement 
at all? To answer that question, it might be best to take a step back 
before stepping forward. Legal philosophers have long been concerned 
with variants of the question, “What is law?”9 They have asked, “What 
is law?” and meant, what makes law uniquely “law” and not something 
else—a game, a policy, or a plan?10 They have also asked, “What is 
law?” and meant, must there be law, and must it be one way and not 
another?11 They have also asked, “What is law?” and meant, what role 
does or should law play in society?12 They have also asked, “What is 
law?” and meant, what is necessary or sufficient for something to be the 
law or against it?13 They have also asked, “What is law?” and meant, 
how do we define or identify that category of things we call laws?14 
They have also asked, “What is law?” and meant, what does or should 
the law entitle people to do, or to have?15 They have also asked, “What 
is law?” and meant, what will a court do when confronted with a case?16 
And this is a non-exhaustive list. 
The question, “What is law?” is a difficult one because it is difficult 
to know what exactly is being asked.17 But there is a different question 
that will help us answer a number of these other questions. That different 
question is whether, for something to be “the law,” officials must agree 
with each other that it is the law, or whether there need not be such 
agreement. Answering this question can tell us a great deal about these 
other questions. It can help us understand what distinguishes law from 
other social practices. It can help us know what purposes law does or 
should serve in society. It can help us, in the actual practice of law, to 
identify those arguments that are legal and those arguments that are non-
legal. The fact of widespread agreement—and, in particular, widespread 
agreement of a particular kind—would be enormously significant if we 
understood it well. 
9. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 223-24 (2001)
(simultaneously lamenting and extolling this litany of “What is law?” variants and its confusions). 
10. Id. at 226-27.
11. Id. at 224.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 223.
14. Id. at 222.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Id.
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977) (making this point).
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According to the leading theory of law, Legal Positivism, for a law 
to be “law,” there must be agreement among officials about what it is 
and what it dictates.18 On this view, a judge would be right on the law to 
hold a particular individual accountable for murder in a particular case 
only if that judge acted pursuant to a convention among legal officials 
dictating that the judge do so.19 This convention, or “social rule,” called 
the rule of recognition sets the criteria by which a judge decides what the 
law is and how to apply it.20 Where the rule of recognition is unclear, the 
law is unclear, and the judge must exercise discretion in deciding the 
case.21 There is no fixed or determinate law to apply in such cases.22 
Put another way, Legal Positivism argues that the very means of 
discovering whether something is against the law is to see if, in the mine 
run of cases, when the question is put before different judges, those 
judges apply the same criteria for determining legal validity and reach 
18. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 290 (2011) (“The idea that the criteria of legality
are determined by consensus is not just one aspect of legal practice among many; on current 
accounts of legal positivism, it is the fundamental ground rule of law. What ultimately makes it the 
case that some rule is a binding legal rule is that it is validated by some standard accepted by 
officials of the group.”); Steven J. Burton, Law As Practical Reason, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 747, 766 
(1989) (“The rule of recognition, and all of the laws identified by it, rest on a social convention.”); 
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 
591 (1993) (“The scope of legal reasons will be set by ‘a rule of recognition’ or binding sources and 
conventions, whereas the scope of legitimating reasons for acting will be set by the relevant political 
theory of the state.”). 
19. This is perhaps the Maginot line between the theory of law expounded by Ronald
Dworkin, who contends that there can be law without convergent social practices, see, e.g., 
DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 36, and those who reject this view, see, e.g. Leiter, Explaining 
Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1222. One way of framing the difference between 
believing judges do or don’t seek to apply—but rather “make”—law turns on whether one believes 
umpires always merely call balls and strikes or sometimes make them. See Charles Yablon, On the 
Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 227, 234 (1994) (“Consider the 
legendary discussion among three umpires as to the proper way to judge whether pitches are balls or 
strikes. Says the first, ‘I call them as I see them.’ The second counters, ‘I call them as they are.’ The 
third responds, ‘they ain’t nothing until I call them.’”); see also DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 32-34, 
39 (“Positivists treat law like baseball revised this way [allowing the umpires to occasionally 
redefine ‘balls’ and ‘strikes’]”). 
20. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 102 & n.119 (2005) (“The rule of recognition specifies binding criteria for 
legal officials to use in deciding whether a given norm is a rule that is part of a legal system.”). 
21. H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 653 (2013) (recently rediscovered,
published posthumously) (setting forth “cases where everyone would agree that we have the 
phenomenon of discretion”). 
22. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 984 (1995)
(“When the law confronts an unanticipated situation raising questions about its underlying goals, the 
problem of open texture will arise, and people interpreting the law will have discretion, in a sense, 
to make law on their own.”). 
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the same results.23 There might be problems of talent, capacity, clarity, 
knowledge, and so forth in the doing, but the application of law—true 
law—is the solving of a formula, not the painting of a portrait.24 There is 
agreement on what the symbols and operators mean and how they fit 
together. A good judge who confronts an easy case could fit the symbols 
and operators together as a matter of expertise in the performance of his 
duties and nothing else.25 
This leads to a critical lemma of Legal Positivism, which is that 
there is no necessary connection between law and morality.26 While 
Legal Positivists are willing to say that moral considerations can be 
operators in the legal formula, none will say that they must be. This has 
become so synonymous with Legal Positivism that some argue the 
separation of law and morals is Legal Positivism’s constitutive feature27 
(though it is fairer to say that dependence on a particular kind of 
conventionality is actually its defining feature).28 
23. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1222 (“[T]he only dispute
about the criteria of legal validity that is possible, on Hart’s view, is an empirical or ‘head count’ 
dispute: namely, a dispute about what judges are doing, and how many of them are doing it, since it 
is the actual practice of officials and their attitudes towards that practice that fixes the criteria of 
legal validity according to the Positivist.”). 
24. Cf. Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 648-49, 666 (1932)
(caricaturing formalism as reducing law to “Rules Times Facts = Decision”). 
25. As a Positivist would be the first to tell you, the very notion that we can speak intelligibly
about one judge or lawyer being better at the law, and one being worse, confirms this facet of Legal 
Positivism. See Joseph Raz, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 37, 48-50 (2d ed. 1979). But this argument is not particularly 
strong for the same reasons that the argument from agreement is not particularly strong. See infra 
Part III. To give something of a preview: history has managed to rank painters and statesmen, but 
few would say they are like mathematicians. 
26. Some would take issue with this formulation of Legal Positivism’s most famous lemma.
John Gardner rejects its existence. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 201. Jules Coleman embraces it. 
See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO 
LEGAL THEORY 152 (2001); id. at 104 n.4 (“As I have used the term, the separability thesis is the 
claim that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. That claim does express a 
tenet of Positivism. . . .”). Positivists appear to be confused about their position on the question. See 
Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1037-
38 (2008). 
27. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 151 (“It is common to characterize Legal
Positivism in terms of two basic tenets: the social fact thesis and the separability thesis. Of the two, 
the separability thesis is more familiar, more closely associated with Positivism, and more 
contested—all of which strikes me as somewhat mystifying”); HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID 
HOLDCROFT, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXTS AND COMMENTARY 3 (1991) (“the quintessence of Legal 
Positivism”). 
28. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 107-08 (“If what unites exclusive and inclusive
Legal Positivism is a commitment to the conventionality of the criteria of legality, what 
distinguishes them is a difference over what can count as a criterion of legality.”); Gardner, supra 
note 9; Green, supra note 26, at 1057 (“Law is a matter of social rules . . . the rule of rules . . . .”). 
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There are other theories of law, some of which disagree 
fundamentally with Legal Positivism’s major premise that legal validity 
is determined by a particular kind of conventionality among legal 
officials. For instance, Natural Law theories have often held that law is 
something outside of us—an omnipresence, like numbers perhaps, that 
seems simply to exist.29 Other theorists have argued that law has no 
conventionality unique to it,30 or it need not, does not, or cannot depend 
on conventionality.31 Those who reject conventionality entirely take the 
view that law is whatever the judge says it is: the interpreter of the law is 
its author.32 This view is often associated with Legal Realism,33 and later 
critical legal studies,34 and is sometimes called the argument from 
indeterminacy35 or rule skepticism.36 Every legal ruling is simply the 
29. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (2d ed. 1980);
MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW 6 (1977). 
30. This was seemingly the position of Lon Fuller and, at various times, Ronald Dworkin.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 140-41 (rev. ed. 1964); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE 
IN ROBES 188-89 (2006); Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 621, 627 (1987). 
31. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 166 (“Dworkin rejects conventionalism of all kinds
and at every turn.”); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 138 (1986) (“[N]othing need be settled as a 
matter of convention in order for a legal system not only to exist but flourish.”). 
32. See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 8 (1958) (quoting Bishop Hoadley’s
sermon before George the First in 1717: “Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret written or 
spoken laws; it is he who is truly the lawgiver to all intents and purposes and not the person who 
wrote or spoke them.”). 
33. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism As Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915, 1917-18 (2005) (“According to this theory, statutes and the like may be law, but they 
are too indeterminate to be significant influences on, or predictors of judges’ decisions. Because the 
law is indeterminate, judges actually decide cases on the basis of non-legal considerations.”); see 
also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing Legal Realism as the 
view “that talk of rules is a myth, cloaking the truth that law consists simply of the decisions of 
courts and the prediction of them . . . .”); DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 3 (characterizing Legal 
Realism as the view that “judges actually decide cases according to their own political or moral 
tastes, and then choose an appropriate legal rule as a rationalization.”); Jon O. Newman, Between 
Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L.. REV. 
200, 203 (1984) (painting Legal Realism as the view that “the judge simply selects the result that 
best comports with personal values and then enlists, sometimes brutally, whatever doctrines 
arguably support the result.”). 
34. See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 205, 227-35 (1986); Girardeau A. Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 
MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal 
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies: 
Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 241-42 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 351, 351-54 (1973). 
35. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283-84 (1989); Brian
Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 487 (1995). 
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 479-80 (1987) (critiquing it); Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of 
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judge’s preferred decision, and every explanation of the ruling merely a 
post-hoc rationalization.37 
Because neither Natural Law theory nor nonconventionality 
theories like Legal Realism or Dworkinism depend for their validity on 
agreement about what the law is, Legal Positivists have been using the 
argument from “massive agreement” as an argument in favor of Legal 
Positivism for decades. The argument is straightforward once you know 
the premises underlying these varying theories. Legal Positivism stems 
from the belief that a kind of massive agreement about law already exists 
and builds a theory around it.38 Legal Positivism thus both predicts 
massive agreement and depends for its vitality upon it. And we see, so 
say the Positivists, massive agreement. On the other hand, other theories 
of law, such as Natural Law, Legal Realism, and Dworkinism, have no 
necessary connection with massive agreement. Not depending for their 
truth on massive agreement, they nonetheless observe massive 
agreement. This is thought to be a profound failure of consilience—the 
principle that all things being equal, we prefer theories that explain more 
things.39 Natural Law theories and nonconventionality theories give no 
explanation of a feature—massive agreement—that Legal Positivists 
Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 683, 688 (1985) (describing the content 
of the theory). 
37. See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical
Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 
(1984) (“Like traditional jurists, the Critical scholars are obsessed with the judicial function and its 
alleged central importance for an understanding of law in society. Yet, while they share this 
infatuation, they adopt a radically different view of the judicial process: All the Critical scholars 
unite in denying the rational determinacy of legal reasoning. Their basic credo is that no distinctive 
mode of legal reasoning exists to be contrasted with political dialogue. Law is simply politics 
dressed in different garb; it neither operates in a historical vacuum nor does it exist independently of 
ideological struggles in society. Legal doctrine not only does not, but also cannot, generate 
determinant results in concrete cases. Law is not so much a rational enterprise as a vast exercise in 
rationalization. Legal doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost infinite spectrum of possible 
outcomes. Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that any such outcome has been derived 
from the dominant legal conceptions. Legal doctrine is nothing more than a sophisticated 
vocabulary and repertoire of manipulative techniques for categorizing, describing, organizing, and 
comparing; it is not a methodology for reaching substantive outcomes. As psychiatrists create ‘a 
monologue of reason about madness,’ so, the CLSers claim, do lawyers establish a fake rationalistic 
discourse out of the chaos of political and social life.”). 
38. See sources cited supra, notes 18-20.
39. See Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76,
79 (1978) (“Consilience is intended to serve as a measure of how much a theory explains, so that we 
can use it to tell when one theory explains more of the evidence than another theory. Roughly, a 
theory is said to be consilient if it explains at least two classes of facts. Then one theory is more 
consilient than another if it explains more classes of facts than the other does. Intuitively, we show 
one theory to be more consilient than another by pointing to a class or classes of facts which it 
explains but which the other theory does not.”). 
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consider endemic to every functioning legal system. 
Hence, Legal Positivists argue that massive agreement about what 
the law is powerfully favors Legal Positivism. As the remainder of this 
Article endeavors to show, however, when we get down to brass-tacks, it 
is unclear what kind of agreement Legal Positivists are referring to when 
they refer to massive agreement, and many of the kinds of agreement 
they could be referring to—were we to use them—would mean there is 
massive disagreement about the law, cutting strongly against Legal 
Positivism. Moreover, other theories of law are capable of explaining 
massive agreement without undermining their core claims. As such, the 
claim of massive agreement seems at best irrelevant and at worst 
actively harmful to the Positivist program. Thus, it is quite puzzling that 
massive agreement is so frequently deployed as an argument for 
Positivism. 
III. WHAT IS LEGAL AGREEMENT?
Legal agreement could mean many things. It could mean (A) 
agreement about the existence of laws; (B) agreement about the meaning 
of legal sources; (C) agreement about how to reason about legal sources; 
(D) agreement about the outcomes of cases; or (E) agreement about legal 
propositions. It is neither naïve nor uncharitable to be confused about 
which of the aforementioned senses is meant when the existence of 
massive legal agreement is asserted. 
Perfect precision is not necessary to every discussion, and it is a 
great virtue that not everything that is said requires further 
clarification.40 But the imprecision in the meaning of “agreement,” as it 
is frequently employed in this context is an important imprecision. This 
is especially so because the argument from massive agreement plays a 
pivotal role in bolstering important arguments about the legitimacy of 
the legal system and the descriptive accuracy of Legal Positivism. In 
keeping the notion of legal agreement vague, individuals offering the 
argument from massive agreement invite us each to pick out what we 
think it means, without realizing we could all think it means something 
different. 
40. 1 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 13-14 (W. Ross trans. 1940) (“Our discussion will
be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be 
sought for alike in all discussions . . . .”). 
9
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A. Setting The Stage: A Hypothetical Statute 
The best way of presenting the different possible ways of 
understanding legal agreement is by way of example. Consider a 
hypothetical statute: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself.” On the one hand, this may seem like a 
bad statute to consider because it carries what some might consider 
extralegal constitutional dimensions. It appears, for example, awfully 
similar to the Fifth Amendment (on account of its identity with it).41 
On the other hand, this statute could not be more banal—every 
jurisdiction, down to the smallest small town, is free to enact it.42 It 
could have been snatched out of a police manual or a court’s local rules. 
As far as I know, every state has something similar.43 One might object 
that this rule of police procedure seems to appear only in constitutions, 
and therefore, is more aspirational than real.44 But one glance at the 
words shows it is not vague or indefinite. It does not invoke abstract 
notions like due process, equal protection, or cruelty and unusualness. 
Rather, it says, simply, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself. Its presence in constitutions seems 
more to measure its importance than its intended operation—one would 
expect that if it were not woven in constitutional fiber, it would be 
written precisely the same way in local codes and ordinances of various 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself”). 
42. See BILL OF RIGHTS DEFENSE COMMITTEE, RESOLUTIONS AND ORDINANCES CRITICAL 
OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND OTHER LAWS AND POLICIES THAT DIMINISH CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(2008) (listing over 400 county and local governments enacting resolutions affirming the Bill of 
Rights). 
43. This was the case at least as of 1965. Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79
HARV. L. REV. 21, 30 (1965) (“In 1791 the privilege against self-incrimination found a place in the 
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution; by 1965 the constitution of every state except 
Iowa and New Jersey has explicitly guaranteed to the accused immunity from self-incrimination in 
criminal proceedings. Iowa and New Jersey have long guaranteed the same immunity by 
legislation.”); see also, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, 
§ 10; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XVI; HAW. 
CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art. I, § 14; KY. 
CONST. § 11; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN. 
CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
44. Laurence Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 87-93 nn.57-58 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997) (contending that 
many provisions of the Bill of Rights—”equal protection” “privileges and immunities” “rights . . . 
retained by the people”—are aspirational in nature, setting forth broad principles to be interpreted in 
succeeding generations, while others serve as an “unambiguous blueprint for running a 
government”). 
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jurisdictions. And so it is.45 Like all of the most beautiful and basic laws, 
it is simple and declarative. It states what is prohibited. In that way, it is 
similar in kind and quality to the laws against murder and mayhem, and 
it can therefore serve as an excellent vehicle for explaining the ways we 
might agree or disagree about what it means. 
Before diving into the various modes of agreement we might have, 
it would be useful to have in mind the following hypotheticals—easy, 
medium, and hard—so we might have a common grammar with which 
to describe the different senses of agreement: 
1) The Case of a Clear Violation but a Procedural Defect in Its
Assertion. Three black men in Mississippi are tried for the murder of a 
white planter.46 The county sheriff takes their statements.47 He testifies 
that the “confessions took place in jail and were free and voluntary,” 
but concedes that while one man was confessing, “another one came in 
who had been so badly whipped and beaten that he was unable to sit 
down.”48 Other evidence showed “without any material conflict,” that 
“all the confessions made to the sheriff and other witnesses were 
forced by brutal whippings and beatings.”49 But the Defendants fail to 
raise their objections to the admission of their statements in accordance 
with state procedural rules, thus, forfeiting them.50 
2) The Case of a Long Interrogation, Contestably Voluntary
Confession. Officers remove a man from his home in the early evening 
hours on a Saturday.51 They take him to an office on the fifth floor of 
the county jail, “equipped with all sorts of crime and detective devices, 
such as a fingerprint outfit, cameras, high-powered lights, and such 
other devices as might be found in a homicide investigating office.”52 
They begin to quiz him continuously, questioning him in relays—they 
themselves becoming so tired they cannot continue.53 At hour twenty-
eight, about 11 p.m. Sunday night, he confesses.54 Or, perhaps, he 
45. Louisiana’s Criminal Code looks similar, for instance, to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the free-and-voluntary confession rule. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:451 (West, 
Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.) (“Before what purports to be a confession can be introduced 
in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the 
influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.”). 
46. Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 339 (Miss. 1935), rev’d, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936). 
47. Id. at 339.
48. Id.at 343 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 341-42.
51. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149 (1944). 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 151.
11
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doesn’t.55 According to officers, “he is ‘cool’, ‘calm’, ‘collected,’ 
‘normal’” at the time of his confession.56 
3) The Case of an Ambiguously Coercive Non-Interrogation. A twelve-
year-old boy is indicted for arson.57 Committed to jail in Philadelphia, 
“several respectable citizens” come visit him in his cell, 
“represent[ing] to him the enormity of the crime.”58 They tell him a 
confession would mean “compassion,” probably, “a pardon,” but no 
confession would leave him “without hope.”59 The inspectors show 
him the dungeon, and explain its “gloom and horror.”60 Though the 
boy “continue[s] to deny his guilt for some time,” at length he 
confesses.61 
4) The Case of Harsh Interrogations of a Non-Citizen Detainee in an
Arguably Non-Criminal Setting. An Algerian native is captured in 
Faisalabad, Pakistan in February 2002 and brought to the Naval Base 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.62 He is subjected to intense interrogations, 
interrupted sleep patterns, and repetitive rounds of “harsh” questioning 
for two months.63 He later makes inculpatory statements.64 
5) The Case of an Interrogation Outside of Custody, Outside of a
Criminal Setting, Without a Miranda Warning. A man is stopped at the 
U.S.-Mexico border and asked a question by a police officer before 
being read his Miranda rights.65 He makes an incriminating 
statement.66 
These cases give a sense of the law’s open texture and the way that 
a simple rule confronts an enormous range of not-so-simple facts.67 The 
55. Id. at 150 (“As to what happened in the fifth-floor jail room during this thirty-six hour
secret examination the testimony follows the usual pattern and is in hopeless conflict.”). 
56. Id. at 151 (“[H]is vision was unimpaired . . . his eyes not bloodshot . . . he showed no
outward signs of being tired or sleepy.”). 
57. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 U.S. 116 (1792).
58. Id. at 116.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Shafiiq v. Obama, 951 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013).
63. Id. at 19.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001).
66. See, e.g., id. at 1098 (“The case books are full of scenarios in which a person is detained
by law enforcement officers, is not free to go, but is not ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes. A traffic 
stop is not custody. A Terry stop-and-frisk is not custody. A brief detention at the border by 
immigration and customs officials of persons presenting themselves for admission to the United 
States is not custody, even though such persons are not free to leave or to refuse to be searched.”); 
id. at 1101. 
67. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 421 (“Open texture is not vagueness, which is always
12
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mantra in law, and even in philosophy of law, often seems to be: 
simplify, simplify. But it is occasionally useful to see that sometimes we 
simplify too much—that the range of possible factual scenarios is nearly 
infinite, and that just when we think we have identified the core or 
archetypical case, we discover no such thing exists. With this 
groundwork in mind, let us now consider the many ways in which we 
might agree about what the law means. 
B. Existential Agreement 
First, and most elementally, we might simply agree that a law 
exists, and that it exists in a certain form with certain words. This is not 
agreement on its semantic content, let alone its legal content. Rather, this 
is agreement that the words that are in it are in it. For the purpose of our 
example, this is agreement that our sample law exists, that it is located in 
a particular authoritative source, and that it says “no person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 
In general, there may not even exist this minimal agreement as to 
the vast majority of laws. The Constitution is both short and arguably 
readable. The individual-rights provisions—those substantive provisions 
that might directly affect the day-to-day interactions of people with, for 
instance, the police—are even shorter and more readable. They are 
located in the commendably succinct Bill of Rights. Yet survey after 
survey and poll after poll show that average Americans have no idea 
what is in the Bill of Rights except in the vaguest terms.68 Remarkably, 
the most basic ground for agreement about the law—agreement about its 
words—is literally absent from society. 
This absence of agreement, moreover, is an absence of agreement 
that rises all the way to the very top: to the words of society’s supreme 
law. People have a sense that they are free to speak, free to publish, free 
to worship. But they do not know the words nor the content of those 
eliminable, but is rather the possibility of future vagueness, which is not eliminable. For example, 
although there is no doubt now about what does and what does not count as a ‘goldfinch,’ an 
encounter with a bird that was like a goldfinch in every respect save that it exploded before our eyes 
would then cause us to be uncertain about whether the exploding creature was or was not a 
goldfinch.”); see also NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 74 (1955) (describing 
“grue” a heretofore unnecessary word for all those things which were green before time t and are 
now blue). 
68. See Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 640-42
(2012) (“Ignorance about basic aspects of the Constitution is also extensive. . . . Only twenty-eight 
percent can name two or more of the five rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. . . . According 
to a 2002 survey, only thirty-one percent realize that Karl Marx’s famous dictum ‘from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ is not in the Constitution.”) 
13
Tutt: Legal Agreement
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
228 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:215 
laws. They rarely wonder, for instance, why fraud is unlawful, question 
the absence of tobacco ads on television, or, ask why the quarterback 
cannot lead a prayer before the big game. Nobody seems to know if you 
really get one phone call in jail.69 Frequently, even the legislators who 
make the laws do not know what it is they are enacting.70 As one 
textbook puts it, “Almost the only knowledge of the law possessed by 
many people is that ignorance of it is no excuse.”71 
Yet ignorance of the law is both broad and deep. Stepping back just 
one level, from the most basic law to the corpus of federal law, it seems 
almost inevitable that individuals are massively unaware of the “more 
than 4,000 federal criminal statutes” in the United States “spread out 
across the fifty-one titles and 27,000 pages of federal law.”72 When 
“federal regulations that can be enforced in criminal prosecutions” are 
added to the mix, “the number of potentially relevant federal laws may 
exceed 300,000.”73 There are so many federal laws “that no one, not 
even the Justice Department, knows the actual number of federal 
criminal offenses.”74 
69. It is a matter of state law, and it is a right of arrestees in some states. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 12.25.150 (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.5 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); IOWA CODE § 804.20 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 33A (West, Westlaw 
through the 2014 2d Annual Sess.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20 (McKinney, Westlaw through 
L.2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-20 (West, Westlaw through Chap. 555 of the Jan. 2014 
session); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-106 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.). One would 
not be remiss in asking if it should not follow a fortiori from the constitutional right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against oneself. 
70. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 34 (1945) (“Now it is a fact often,
if not always, a considerable number of those who vote for a bill have at most a very superficial 
knowledge of its contents.”). 
71. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 451 (2d ed. 1983); see also Meir
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 625, 645-46 (1984) (“If one were to take a poll and ask about the legal significance 
of ignorance of law, most non-lawyers would answer, I believe, by citing the maxim that ‘ignorance 
of the law is no excuse.’”). 
72. Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 739 (2012). 
73. Id. at 739-40.
74. Id. at 739-41 (“The federal criminal law also is not limited to crimes that mirror any
readily recognizable moral code. No criminal code that outlaws the unauthorized use of Smokey the 
Bear’s image or the slogan ‘Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute’ can credibly claim to exclude trivial 
conduct wholly unrelated to moral delinquency. Other equally nefarious crimes are the failure to 
keep a pet on a leash that does not exceed six feet in length; digging or leveling the ground at a 
campsite picnicking in a non-designated area; operating a ‘motorized toy, or an audio device, such 
as a radio, television set, tape deck or musical instrument, in a manner . . . [[t]hat exceeds a noise 
level of 60 decibels measured on the A-weighted scale at 50 feet’ (whatever that means); ‘[b]athing, 
or washing food, clothing, dishes, or other property at public water outlets, fixtures or pools’ not 
designated for that purpose; ‘[a]llowing horses or pack animals to proceed in excess of a slow walk 
when passing in the immediate vicinity of persons on foot or bicycle’; operating a snowmobile that 
14
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Moreover, even the saltiest litigators are often unaware of the scope 
and breadth of the procedural doctrines that might be brought to bear in 
run-of-the-mine lawsuits. Few lawyers realize the potentially enormous 
consequences, for example, of a misunderstanding in an oral argument.75 
Fewer still can name the doctrines that might be used to punish one: 
judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, collateral estoppel, 
“mend the hold,” “fraud on the court,” judicial and evidentiary 
admission, forfeiture, and, waiver, to name a few. Sometimes “the courts 
do not even clearly identify why an inconsistent [litigating] position 
should be precluded; it seems rather to be a matter of it ‘just isn’t 
right.’”76 
Frequently, situations arise where existential agreement is 
unobtainable because uncertainty over what law “there is” is too great. 
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has been developing an array of 
doctrines that deal precisely with this—prominently in the areas of 
criminal law77 and official immunity from civil liability78—permitting 
courts to deny redress for past constitutional violations when the claim 
to relief rests on “new” law.79 But “new” law isn’t “new” law—it is, 
rather, an “unpredict[ed]” application of the constitution’s existing 
requirements.80 
The legal system makes a number of concessions to the problem of 
existential uncertainty. Judges’ evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a 
very deferential standard by appellate courts.81 Decisions about whether 
to issue preliminary injunctions or declaratory judgments are also 
makes ‘excessive noise’; using roller skates, skateboards, roller skis, coasting vehicles, or similar 
devices in non-designated areas; failing to turn in found property to the park superintendent ‘as soon 
as practicable’; and using a surfboard on a beach designated for swimming.”). 
75. See, e.g., Ergo Sci., Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1996); Veillon v.
Exploration Servs., Inc., 876 F.2d 1197, 1199 (5th Cir. 1989). 
76. Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with a
Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable 
Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, “Mend the Hold,” “Fraud on the Court” and 
Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 591-92 (1998). 
77. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-17 (1989) (holding that subject only to
narrow exceptions, a federal habeas court should dismiss claims based on “new” rules of 
constitutional law without reaching the merits). 
78. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (holding that officials sued
in constitutional tort actions generally are immune from damages liability unless their conduct 
violated “clearly established” law). 
79. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733-38 (1991). 
80. See id. at 1758-77.
81. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 780-83 (1982).
15
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reviewed under this deferential standard.82 The decision to issue a 
warrant is reviewed with “great deference.”83 Additionally, the 
reasonable suspicions of police officers are given this same deference.84 
Administrative agencies classically receive substantial deference in their 
judgments about what the law means.85 Judges also show deference to 
other judges through the practice of following precedent, a practice that 
stems in no small measure from humility in the face of uncertainty about 
what the law is. If recent academic writing on the relationship between 
caseloads and appellate scrutiny is given its due, deference is often 
directly traceable to how much time judges and their clerks have 
available to devote to finding out what the law is.86 
But building in an escape hatch for uncertainty about what law 
exists is not agreement. Deference is not agreement. Deference is 
agreement that what law “there is” is uncertain.87 
All this is to say that the argument from massive agreement cannot 
be referring to massive agreement about what the laws are. At the zeroth 
step of inquiry into what the law is—”what laws are there?”—there 
almost certainly exists very little agreement at all. 
C. Content Agreement 
Existential agreement is merely one way of looking at agreement, 
and almost certainly not the way that is meant when it is asserted that 
“there is massive and pervasive agreement about the law throughout the 
system.”88 After all, it cannot be, at least not without undermining the 
claim to massive agreement right out of the gate. Another way we might 
agree about what the law is, then, is that we might agree about what the 
law means when a law (or the law) is put before us. There are two ways 
of understanding this form of agreement, and this section will take up 
82. See id. at 773-79.
83. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 419 (1969)). 
84. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700 (1996) (holding that review of police
officer’s reasonableness must give due weight to “police experience and expertise”). 
85. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 511 (1989) (“[T]he courts will accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the 
ambiguous terms of a statute that the agency administers.”). 
86. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111-12 (2011) (presenting
empirical evidence suggesting a causal link between judicial burdens and the outcomes of appeals). 
87. The law may be determinate and knowable at any moment, but it may be the case that
there is not enough time to determine it. But there is an important difference between uncertainty 
and indeterminacy: it is the difference between what is unknown and what is unknowable. 
88. Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1227.
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss2/2
2015] LEGAL AGREEMENT 231 
both of them. They are agreement about semantic (or communicative) 
content and agreement about legal content. 
1. Semantic Content Agreement
The first form of content agreement we might be referring to when 
we refer to massive agreement as a kind of content agreement is what 
might be called semantic, communicative or linguistic agreement. That 
means agreement about language as language—it includes more than 
words, but also sentences, paragraphs, texts, and so on, but, it 
understands their meaning as part of language conventions as opposed to 
legal conventions.89 
Quite often, in conversation, we exchange phrases between one 
another and ask each other “what we really mean.” But sometimes we 
are left to hopelessly attempt to puzzle out what someone meant without 
the opportunity to ask him or her. That case is determined by semantic 
agreement. Putting aside any opportunity to elaborate through 
applications, criteria, tests, archetypes, examples, or hypotheticals, 
semantic agreement turns on each of us having a shared understanding 
of what is meant in English without the opportunity to ask anyone else 
what they think is meant.90 
A skeptic might say that when our concern is legal agreement, this 
form of agreement would seem almost beside the point. Semantic 
agreement is just the agreement that allows an English speaker to 
distinguish between the meaning of the words “wife” and “hat.” It is the 
type of agreement that makes this text intelligible to a native English 
speaker at all. But even hardened Positivists agree there is no necessary 
connection between semantic meaning and legal meaning, and most 
would agree that semantic meaning cannot be all that there is to deciding 
propositions of law.91 
89. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 44, at 117 (“[T]extualism
insists on deference to one kind of intention—semantic intention”). 
90. David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 & n.76 (1992)
(“Effective communication constantly requires us to use words (like ‘table’ or ‘red’ or ‘addition’) in 
novel situations in the same way other people would. We are confident in our abilities to do so, even 
though we typically lack the benefit of their views about correct usage until after we have spoken.”); 
id. at 20 (“When we say that someone has applied a concept correctly (like the operation called 
‘addition’ or the adjective ‘red’), we mean that he or she acted the way we would. Fluency in a 
language means that a subject is able to make such judgments correctly, intuitively and without 
reflection, and without first consulting other community members.”); see Schauer, supra note 8, at 
414-20. 
91. For an excellent discussion of the distinction between these two forms of meaning, see
Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 
17
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A debate about semantic meaning’s special importance to law 
formed the core of one of the most famous jurisprudential debates in 
history: the Hart-Fuller debate.92 It then became the fulcrum over which 
debates about legal determinacy and indeterminacy flourished for 
another half-century.93 As such, the idea that agreement on what the law 
is might be reducible to—or at the very least intimately bound up with—
semantic agreement remains a plausible candidate for what is meant 
when legal agreement is discussed. 
The Hart-Fuller debate began with Hart’s insistence—in the face of 
criticisms by Legal Realists that all legal rules are hopelessly 
indeterminate94—that there exist a multitude of easy cases because there 
is widespread agreement about ordinary semantic or language 
meaning.95 Fuller responded by insisting that it takes little imagination to 
generate an almost limitless number of cases that seem like they should 
be easy from a language-view, but are in fact quite hard from a legal-
content view.96 Both were right, since neither was disputing the other’s 
core claim. There are many easy cases arising from shared semantic-
content meanings, and there are many semantically easy-looking cases 
that are in fact hard because of other non-semantic considerations.97 
Given significant revisions in the claims of Legal Positivism and its 
alternatives in the years since 1958, it is not clear that the points that 
Hart and Fuller were attempting to win against one another have precise 
contemporary relevance. But the very fact of the debate—and 
subsequent debates—shows that many legal scholars plant their flag 
largely on semantic agreement as the form of massive agreement about 
517-19 (2013) (“Even an exclusive legal positivist might deny that all legal content is the product of 
the full set of legally operative texts.”). For a lighthearted discussion of the long-standing debates 
over the possibility that law cannot live on text alone, see Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 
29 J.L. & POL. 309, 314-22 (2014). 
92. Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109
(2008) (abstract) (“The 1958 debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart in the pages of the 
Harvard Law Review is one of the landmarks of modern jurisprudence.”). 
93. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 8, at 417.
94. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 606-07 (1958). 
95. Id.; Schauer, supra note 92, at 1119 (“Hart’s claim, at least in 1958, was that the statutory
language, as language, would generate some number of clear or core applications. . . .”). 
96. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 662-65 (1958). 
97. This is emphatically not the argument from “weird cases.” See Schauer, supra note 8, at
420-23. The question is instead whether Fuller was not right that the world is such that hard cases 
proliferate to such a degree as to render even an admittedly large number of easy cases 
comparatively small. Cf. id. at 427-28. 
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the law that people share.98 On this view, it is semantic agreement that 
makes easy cases easy, and since language is widely considered to be a 
conventional practice—we can only understand one another because of 
shared meanings we have developed together99—this at least makes 
much of law, if not all of law, conventional as well. 
There are two problems with these claims, one of which can only 
be flagged for later, the other of which will be addressed in the section 
immediately following this one. First, what must be flagged for later is 
whether our choice of theory should be affected at all if, in fact, 
semantic agreement is the form of massive agreement we all share. 
Because of language’s conventionality, it can be used as a tool. In 
particular, a clever polity might coopt language for use in 
operationalizing, or instantiating, or creating a “conception” of legal 
rules, legal principles, or legal propositions. But it should be noticed that 
semantic agreement does not make law uniquely law at all—instead it is 
used to instantiate law derived from some other source. Put another way, 
because language is a tool—much like a fence or a wall—it need not 
itself be the law. A wall is not the law, though it may instantiate the law 
by preventing trespass. Perhaps in the same way, a statute threatening 
sanctions for trespass is not the law either, even though it also prevents 
trespass. In this way, the question of which comes first—the language or 
the law—bedevils legal theory and our understandings of legal 
agreement. This argument, that legal propositions are frequently, if not 
always, merely gloss on the law; that language primarily operationalizes 
other norms; and, that as such legal propositions are frequently, if not 
98. See Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1296
(2014) (calling this “the Standard Picture”: “According to this vague picture—I hesitate to call it a 
theory—the content of the law is primarily constituted by linguistic (or mental) contents associated 
with the authoritative legal texts. The Standard Picture is extremely widely taken for granted, and 
assumed to be common ground (though it is rarely explicitly espoused).”); Leiter, Explaining 
Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1230 (“Someone familiar with mundane legal practice—
the ordinary problems and issues that arise, most of which do not lead to litigation—might 
reasonably conclude that if there is a governing rule of interpretation at work in law, it is something 
like ‘ordinary meaning controls, except when its import is absurd or repugnant, at which point 
interpretive opportunism takes hold.’”); Schauer, supra note 8, at 414-20. 
99. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 242 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1968) (“If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.”); id. §§ 225-27 (discussing 
agreement about correct solutions to mathematical problems); see also SAUL A. KRIPKE, 
WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION 96 (1982) 
(“On Wittgenstein’s conception, such agreement is essential for our game of ascribing rules and 
concepts to each other”); id. at 86-113 (explaining that Wittgenstein stresses importance of 
agreement about correct use of rules and concepts, and of “shared form of life” for deciphering 
meaning). 
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always vulnerable to point-of-application attacks via challenges to their 
merits, may pose a powerful alternative to Legal Positivism.100 
Second, all sides concede that semantic meaning does not cover the 
entire scope of legal agreement and disagreement in any event. Some 
legal decisions fly in the face of absolutely clear language, and yet all 
sides agree that they should do so.101 In some cases, judges and litigants 
seem to argue over issues as if the language is only a starting point for 
general historical, moral or political debate.102 The next section takes up 
this sort of content agreement: legal content agreement. 
2. Legal Content Agreement
Still preoccupied with recovering the meaning of our hypothetical 
statute, but having acknowledged the limits of language, we might posit 
the existence of a kind of content agreement that involves specialized 
understandings, unique to law, legal practice, and American legal 
culture. This essay adopts Lawrence Solum’s notion of “legal content” 
agreement because the label itself communicates the idea well.103 There 
are a thousand ways that this form of agreement is described—
sometimes it is called recourse to practical reason,104 or explained 
through the ideas of legal and cultural narrative105 or ideology,106 or 
 100.  See COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 161-73 (noting Positivism offers no theory for 
determining or identifying “legal content” and explaining that “[t]o his credit, Dworkin has done 
more than anyone else to develop a general theory of legal content.”). 
101.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 515-20 (1988). 
 102.  This kind of interpretation is perhaps best summed up and explained by the line, “we 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.” McCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); accord Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 443 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) (elaborating on the admonition). This idea creates a set of 
boundaries and expectations: an entire normative universe; quite different than if one is expounding 
the rules of Chess. 
103.  Solum, supra note 91, at 509-10; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten 
Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1937-40 (2013). 
 104.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, 
and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1992) (“Practical reason, unfortunately, is 
easier to invoke than to define.”); Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 28-29 (1986). 
 105.  See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4-10 (1983) (“We 
inhabit a nomos—a normative universe. . . . In this normative world, law and narrative are 
inseparably related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse—to be 
supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose.”); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Narrative, Normativity, and Causation, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 597, 610, 621 (2010) 
(“Narratives structure our understanding of the world . . . .”). 
 106.  See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Ideology As Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1991); J. 
M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 199-200 (1990); Jack M. Balkin, 
Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 UMKC L. REV. 392, 422 
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professional conventions,107 or membership in a shared interpretive 
community,108 or the experience of a “shared form of life.”109  Other 
times it is called “construction”110 or interpretation in “context.”111 
All of these are efforts to get at the idea that language itself does 
not exhaust the kinds of content agreement we might have merely by 
virtue of its conventions alone. You need to be from the place, perhaps 
socialized in the practice, to understand what is actually being 
referenced, commanded, allowed, prohibited, or created by its law.112 
Legal content agreement is not quite the same as technical meaning—it 
is neither truer nor more accurate than some other meaning—but rather, 
is understood differently because its meaning is made in a particular 
time and place, among a particular set of actors, acting in particular 
roles. 
There are many famous illustrations depicting the distinction 
between semantic content and legal content agreement.113 Often, legal 
content agreement is tacitly reduced to the idea that words, phrases, and 
(1987); Denis J. Brion, Rhetoric and the Law of Enterprise, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 117, 157-59 
(1991); Segall, supra note 7, at 1031 (“CLS argues that there are easy cases and that law is 
relatively stable only because judges interpreting the law share common values and ideals.”). 
 107.  Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 125 (1984); Millon, 
supra note 90, at 30. 
 108.  See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 746 
(1982); Millon, supra note 90, at 21. 
109.  See, e.g., KRIPKE, supra note 99, at 96. 
 110.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 103 (2010). 
111.  David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 14-15 (David Kairys ed., 
1982); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997); 
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 
396-97 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1174-82 (1993). 
 112.  Put another way, “Deathstar,” “Hydrospanner,” “Force,” and “Lightsaber” mean very 
different things to Han Solo and Harrison Ford. So too do words like “droid,” “pilot,” “smuggler,” 
“republic,” and “parsec.” This parlor game can be played across a number of different domains all 
in service of the same point—”Hunger Games” means something very different to Katniss Everdeen 
than Jennifer Lawrence. “The Matrix” means something very different to Neo than Keanu Reeves, 
etc. 
 113.  See, e.g., Tutt, supra note 91, at 320 (describing the legal-versus-semantic content debate 
in United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir. 1990) over whether PCP and blotter 
paper are a “mixture” of PCP and blotter paper “resulting in an enormous sentencing enhancement 
for those unfortunate enough to transport their PCP via blotter paper and not some lighter means”); 
id. at 320-21 (describing the legal-versus-semantic content debate in Smith v. United States, 508 
U.S. 223 (1993) over whether it counts as “using” a gun “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug 
trafficking crime” to offer to trade a gun for cocaine); Greenberg, supra, note 98, at 1291-92 
(discussing the same case); Tutt, supra note 91, at 338-39 (describing FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) where the Supreme Court divided 5-4 over whether the FDA had 
authority to regulate cigarettes “even though nicotine is a ‘drug’ and the FDA has the authority to 
regulate ‘drug delivery devices’”). 
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documents acquire specialized content through their history and 
development as uniquely legal materials. In this way, the First 
Amendment114 and Eighth Amendment mean both more and less than 
the full semantic import of their words.115 No statute can be read without 
careful attention to what past courts have said about its meaning even if 
that results in a slow, steady drift further and further from the semantic 
meaning of its words.116 
Legal content agreement sweeps far beyond the idea that text on a 
particular document might mean something other than what it would 
mean to a reasonably able reader of English unfamiliar with America’s 
legal customs and traditions.117 For instance, the very ability to identify 
legal materials as legal materials frequently stems from agreement about 
what counts as a valid legal source without looking to any particular 
text. 
Phillip Bobbitt’s identification of six “modalities” of constitutional 
argument is probably among the finest explanations of what we mean 
when we refer to legal content agreement apart from semantic 
agreement. The six modalities are textual, historical, structural, 
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments, and each can be objectively 
regarded as a legitimate method of determining constitutional 
meaning.118 While Bobbitt self-consciously presented his modalities as 
the key to legitimizing judicial review (because the objective nature of 
these modalities means that the Supreme Court’s decisions striking 
down unconstitutional laws can be shown to be impartial, rather than 
114.  Solum, supra note 91, at 480. 
115.  Dworkin, supra note 89, at 119-27. 
116.  See, e.g. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 729 (1988) (“Given existing interpretations of our civil liberties guarantees, 
precisely what does it mean to assert that there is a textual Bill of Rights, apart from fixing some 
outer perimeter limiting judicial decisionmaking?”). Apologies must be made for the continual 
focus on Constitutional texts. Such a focus is not required. The Administrative Procedure Act and 
the Sherman Act are two federal laws whose interpretations have also become almost fully 
untethered from their words. See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There A Text in This 
Class?”: The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 620 
(2005) (“Antitrust cases generally discuss precedent and economic policy. They rarely include more 
than a passing citation to the statutory text.”); Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389, 1421 (1996) (“For Justice Jackson, the fact that the Act may have 
‘contain[ed] many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities’ was an invitation 
to an activist, constructive judicial role.”). 
 117.  See Schauer, supra note 8, at 418 (arguing that semantic content agreement is responsible 
for most legal agreement because “[h]owever sketchy and distorted the understanding it might be,” 
reading a legally authoritative source still imparts an immense amount of legal information because 
it is written in English). 
118.  PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982). 
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political), more interesting for purposes of understanding legal content 
agreement is that the six modalities of constitutional argument do in fact 
canvass nearly the whole terrain of legal argument.119 Bobbitt 
recognized that this conventionality was arbitrary, calling it “a legal 
grammar that we all share and that we have all mastered,” but noting that 
“arguments are conventions . . . they could be different, but . . . then we 
would be different.”120 Nonetheless, textual, historical, structural, 
prudential, doctrinal, and ethical arguments were “the kinds of 
arguments one finds in judicial opinions, in hearings, and in briefs.”121 
No one asks why these arguments—and not some other set—appear to 
be the legitimate modes of not just constitutional argument, but much 
legal argument in American law.122 In this way, an imperceptible set of 
conventions channel and structure our thinking about how legal 
propositions should be decided. 
Embedded in this modal structure is the interesting insight that only 
one of the six modes of legal argument is actually grounded in semantic 
content agreement. The other five (historical, structural, prudential, 
doctrinal, and ethical arguments)—so pervasive in law and essential 
elements of legal agreement—are not rooted in what the law’s words 
say. They do not depend on language conventions. As such, it is possible 
to talk about different senses of legality, because it is possible to talk 
about argumentation within one convention to the exclusion of the 
others. One can talk about what the Constitution’s text means, or what 
its history dictates, for instance, without actually talking about what 
legal rights individuals have under it, because, for example, the 
decisions of the Warren Court mean that regardless of the Constitution’s 
text and history, the constitution demands that a Miranda warning be 
read,123 evidence obtained by an illegal search be excluded,124 and 
violations of the Fourth Amendment be remediable via a Bivens action 
 119.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 22 (1991); id. at 24 (“If we 
want to understand the ideological and political commitments in law, we have to study the grammar 
of law, that system of logical constraints that the practices of legal activities have developed in our 
particular culture. A study of the modalities gives us such a description.”); id. at 27 (“Once we 
looked carefully at constitutional argument, it became apparent that the legitimacy of judicial 
review was maintained by adherence to these forms of argument. An opinion stated in these terms 
was accepted as legitimate and so also for briefs and oral arguments, whereas other forms of 
argument, some acceptable in other legal cultures, rendered a decision quite illegitimate . . . .”). 
120.  BOBBITT, supra note 118, at 6. 
121.  Id. 
122.  See also J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1771, 1776-80 (1994) (objecting). 
123.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
124.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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in federal court.125 
Even these legal grammars change over time. H. Jefferson Powell’s 
research into the legal culture of the founding generation and the early 
Supreme Court have shown that that generation possessed ideas about 
how to understand legal commands, legal authority, and legal texts far 
different from our own.126 Semantic content was an essential and 
decisive element of constitutional argument, but invocation of 
extratextual principles—rights and duties embedded in a higher Natural 
Law—were frequent.127 Legislatures, state and federal, and certainly the 
President, were thought by many to be coequal legal interpreters and 
expositors.128 The Americans constructed a shared legal-political 
grammar in a remarkably short period out of materials they had readily 
at hand, namely the tools of religious and scholarly interpretation that 
informed other areas of political and social life.129 Yet only some of 
those practices arose from text. Agreement on the rest was tacit. It was, 
as Legal Positivists would say, conventional. 
 125.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
 126.  For the sources undergirding the discussion in this paragraph, see H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 642-62 (1993); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949 (1993); H. 
Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); and H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 127.  See Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, supra note 126, at 964-
68 (“American constitutional discourse in this period was not conducted solely in terms of 
arguments from, or about the meaning of, the texts of the federal and state constitutions. Indeed, a 
striking feature of early constitutional debate was the invocation of a veritable host of extratextual 
authorities: ‘the spirit of the Constitution’; the ‘fundamental principles’ of the constitution, of free 
government, or of republicanism; ‘natural justice’; and so on.”). 
 128.  Id. at 974-85 (“[A] major theme in early constitutional debate concerned rival claims of 
interpretive authority. Various people during the period claimed major roles in constitutional 
interpretation for Congress, the President, the federal courts, the state legislatures, the state courts, 
and state conventions; the two primary disputes were over the finality of judicial interpretation, and 
the identity of ultimate interpretive authority in the federal Union.”). 
 129.  Id. at 1008 (“Viewed from the perspective of specific political issues, the founding era 
appears to have been a time of remarkably widespread constitutional dissension. . . . The founding 
era’s very real battles over substantive constitutional questions, however, were articulated-indeed, 
were made possible-by the emergence of a common set of ideas, problems, and structures of 
argument.”); see also Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, supra note 126, at 
887-88 (explaining that “cultural influences of Enlightenment rationalism and British Protestantism 
combined in an unlikely alliance” opposite the interpretive practices drawn from “[t]he rich 
interpretive tradition of the English common law”—though the interpretive practices of the common 
law ultimately won out). 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss2/2
2015] LEGAL AGREEMENT 239 
3. Limits of Content Agreement
It would be both tidy and compelling to conclude that content 
agreements and disagreements exhaust the kinds of agreement and 
disagreement we might have. There can be no doubt that agreements of 
these two kinds cover an immeasurably enormous territory. Where 
semantic content agreement fails, legal content agreement points us 
toward authoritative sources and can fill in many of the gaps or holes in 
what the statute, precedent, or past practice means. 
Moreover, we do experience fulsome and meaningful 
disagreements over language and law rooted only in pure disagreements 
about its content. Language is conventional, but its adoption by native 
speakers, and their sense of proper usage, is unconscious. A native 
speaker can articulate that a particular usage is proper or improper 
according to both conscious and unconscious understandings. She can 
articulate theories of these usages and adopt prescriptive accounts of 
how language should be spoken and used even though she is a mere 
participant in the shared practice.130 Native English speakers learn 
English in schools precisely so they can understand and articulate the 
usages of their own language in a useful manner.131 
By the same token, however, disagreements about language 
frequently are not purely rooted in disagreements about content. Not 
infrequently, disagreements about language are about how English 
should be spoken, rather than how it is spoken. Admittedly, few would 
say that having a strong opinion about the proper usage of the word 
“whom” is necessarily a moral opinion. But no one would deny that 
having a strong opinion about the proper usage of language is 
normative—whether that normativity is rooted in a descriptivist or 
prescriptivist view of language—and to the degree it affects how we 
understand one another, this has important implications for language, for 
law, and potentially for all human endeavors.132 
Thus, even content agreements do not exhaust the forms of 
agreement. In our weaker moments, we might be tempted to say that 
130.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 1779. 
131.  See Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, supra note 106, at 200-01. 
132.  See Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 558 (2010) 
(“In Law’s Empire, interpretivism [a normative theory] governs all of law. And in Hedgehogs, 
interpretivism provides the normative theory for all human endeavors except science. If this pattern 
continues, we might expect that Dworkin’s next book will take up the philosophy of science, 
extending interpretivism to this final domain.”); see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 
1774 (“[A]s a normative matter, the grammarian has the right, just as any other speaker does, to 
attempt to influence the course and development of the language she studies.”). 
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legal agreement and disagreement are captured entirely by semantic and 
legal content agreements and disagreements, and that disagreements of 
all other kinds are somehow non-legal disagreements. They are 
arguments about the proper application of admitted discretion, for 
example. But while content agreement could be the source of a great 
deal of agreement about law, even Legal Positivists must concede it is 
not the only such source of legal agreement. In fact, there is strong 
reason to believe that content agreement is not—or cannot be—the kind 
of agreement Legal Positivists are referring to when they speak of 
massive agreement about what the law is. 
D. Extensional and Intensional Agreement 
Even in the shared usages of language and law, there is a vast area 
of potential disagreement in the space between the description and the 
described. Here, we cannot say there is agreement about content because 
the content of the description is inadequate. Instead, we must say there is 
agreement about how to reason about, or extend, a vague or ambiguous 
concept—one admittedly lacking in deducible content. This kind of 
meaning-making, which this Essay calls “extensional and intensional” is 
a fact of life, though it is uncomfortable because it involves the 
imputation of content where no content existed before.133 It is 
unavoidably normative in character. 
Examples of extensional and intensional agreement abound. 
Language is an imperfect medium, so both speakers and listeners often 
confront situations in which they say more or less than they intend, or 
understand more or less than they should.134 When I describe a chair, for 
instance, and mean to refer to a special kind of professional accolade 
rather than article of furniture,135 that usages create a kind of confusion. 
If I did not realize that what I sought to communicate would have a 
double-effect, and did not clarify it, my statement would either be 
misunderstood or ambiguous. If context did not give away my meaning, 
it would be impossible to tell what was intended. In such a situation, the 
listener must reason about what was meant. The content of the statement 
133.  This terminology has been used elsewhere in discussion of this topic, if only rarely. See, 
e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 324-25 (1997).
 134.  LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR 
INTERPRETATION 62-63 (2010) (“[T]ry to define ‘book’ or ‘pen’ or anything else in your immediate 
reach so that your definition includes all instances of the concept and not much else; you will find 
the task both daunting and time-consuming.”). 
 135.  For example, the “Chair” of the History Department or the Honorable George J. Mitchell, 
L’61 “Chair” in Law and Public Policy. 
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is not deducible, and the process of deriving it is not necessarily rooted 
in a shared form of life. The meanings of phrases that are vague by 
nature, such as “a little” or “a lot” are also difficult to deduce.136 
Affixing meaning to many seemingly simple statements is therefore 
unavoidable normative because it involves the exercise of judgment on 
the basis of an extraordinary amount of often unknown and ineffable 
criteria (it is normative because deciding that you will derive my 
meaning based on your thoughts about what I should have meant is 
normative unless you and I share a more general agreement that we will 
look to certain rules in resolving doubts137). For example, saying that 
“reasonable delays will be excused” is not necessarily an invitation to 
legislate what counts as “reasonable.” It could mean that one (e.g., a 
judge) should look to a library of prior decisions as a basis for 
determining what is reasonable. However, it could be an invitation to 
exercise personal judgment and discretion on a case-by-case basis. In 
other words, at the zeroth step, a judge must decide in what manner to 
understand how much discretion has been delegated—if any at all—
when confronted with a statute requiring the application of 
reasonableness. 
Extensional and intensional interpretations arise precisely when 
semantic and legal content agreement run out. No longer can the listener 
and the speaker say that they share a mutual understanding about how to 
deduce the content of a statement. The listener has to impute, one way or 
another, what the listener thinks the speaker meant. The same is true of 
imputation of the legal effect of a particular legal claim or material. Of 
course, it must be admitted that there might even be massive agreement 
about how to impute the content of vague or ambiguous legal materials. 
After all, extensional agreement would just be agreement about how to 
reason from a particular quantum of evidence. Extensional agreement 
would therefore exist where a speaker, upon seeing his statement 
interpreted, would fill the same gaps in meaning in the same manner 
and, therefore, arrive at the same result. We do this all the time. In that 
way, content agreement plus extensional agreement (where gaps exist) 
could be the kind of massive agreement that Legal Positivists describe 
 136.  I distinguish between ambiguity, which deals in matters of kind, and vagueness, which 
deals in matters of degree. Dworkin distinguished them as the difference between “testing or pivotal 
cases” and “borderline cases.” DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 41. 
 137.  In law, that would be legal content agreement, and then your statement would not be 
vague or ambiguous anyway. “A lot” would not really mean “a lot”—it would mean, look to some 
rule we share for deducing how much “a lot” is, and use that amount. It would become a tacit unit of 
measure. 
27
Tutt: Legal Agreement
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
242 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:215 
when they describe massive agreement. 
There are innumerable forms of extensional agreement because it 
involves settling on shared meanings on the basis of incomplete content. 
Four broad categories have formed important aspects of debates in 
jurisprudence, usually in the context of showing that much of law is 
animated by disagreement. They are: (1) paradigmatic agreement (2) 
criterial agreement, (3) theoretical agreement, and (4) incompletely 
theorized agreement. This section describes them briefly. 
1. Paradigmatic Agreement
Paradigmatic agreement arises when we do not agree on the 
overarching concept, but we agree about certain paradigm instances of 
the concept.138 With ambiguous concepts like “art”, we might select 
individual paintings, movies, or novels and say that we agree that they 
are in the class. For vehicles, it might be planes, trains, and automobiles, 
as well as a hodgepodge of more exotic motorized devices. For vague 
concepts, like many and few, or a lot and a little, or jumbo and micro, or 
purple, we might attempt to settle on our individual understandings of 
the supremum (the least upper bound) and infimum (the greatest lower 
bound). If we are fortunate, we need never totally agree on how much, 
exactly, is too much or too little. 
Notice however, that paradigmatic agreement is not agreement on 
the content of the concept.139 It is something less. It is recourse to 
another form of judgment. We must negotiate with one another to settle 
on the contours of the concept through appeals to paradigms precisely 
because we do not completely understand one another. Recourse to 
paradigmatic agreement, therefore, introduces the possibility of 
normativity in a way that semantic content agreement and legal content 
agreement simply do not. It is fundamentally different. 
To give an example, in a debate about whether or not Pluto is a 
planet, two individuals might attempt to articulate paradigm cases of 
“planet-ness” and then reason back from an individual celestial object’s 
inclusion in the category as reason to also include Pluto (or not include 
it). But when these arguments are marshaled, they are normative in 
character even if two individuals agree on the ultimate outcome: 
“Because Mercury is a planet, Pluto should be as well.” Or, “because 
certain very large asteroids in the asteroid belt are not planets, Pluto also 
 138.  Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CALIF. L. REV. 277, 
295 (1985). 
139.  See Millon, supra note 90, at 18-19 & n.54. 
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should not be a planet.” These arguments from paradigm cases do not 
help participants in the shared conversation to actually identify all those 
objects which are and are not planets, nor even identify what criteria 
make planets “planets” and not something else, but nonetheless can be 
grounds for agreement and disagreement about how to resolve concrete 
cases, such as whether Jupiter, Earth or Pluto are properly termed 
planets or not. In a similar way, two individuals could agree about how 
cases should be decided without ever agreeing on what the law actually 
is. 
2. Criterial Agreement
As the name suggests, criterial agreement arises when we do not 
agree on the overarching concept, but we agree on criteria about it.140 
More frequently, quite the opposite circumstance arises—we agree on 
the concept but not all of its criteria. Because criterial disagreement is 
another form of estimating what was meant—rather than deducing what 
was meant—one can make recourse to criteria rather than paradigms in 
resolving disputes over meaning. 
When we do not simultaneously agree on all the criteria for 
understanding, interpreting, or applying a concept, we enter something 
that looks very much like prescriptivist grammarian mode. For example, 
two individuals might be attempting to determine what it is that makes 
something a “chair.” I think a chair is a piece of furniture with four legs 
and a back. You think it is anything on which one can comfortably sit. 
We each believe that there are different criteria for establishing what is 
and is not a chair. In resolving our conflict, we might make appeals to 
other forms of agreement to test whether our criterion hold in paradigm 
cases, or are consistent with other evidence of the content of the 
concept—I say, look it up in the dictionary; you say, look to what is 
commonly described as a chair. I say are stools chairs? You say, are 
Panton chairs not chairs? I say, look to the psycholinguistic studies: 
when someone says, “chair,” the first thing that comes to mind is a four-
legged straight-backed piece of furniture. You say you can find too 
many exceptions, from sculptures to tree stumps. We say to each other: 
why is your evidence relevant? On and on we argue, even over 
concededly constrained terrain, even using a shared legal grammar.141 
By all outward signs, our disagreement appears normative, and it 
140.  Moore, supra note 138, at 296. 
141.  See Millon, supra note 90, at 18 n.54. 
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appears basic.142 One could have the disagreement even in the easiest of 
easy cases. For example, a dispute over what it means for a vehicle to be 
“in” the park, or the freedom of speech to be “abridged.” On the other 
hand, there are many instances in which criteria of or for a concept have 
been definitely settled and are now widely shared. Magic words and 
rituals often work in this fashion—the ritual comes to be equated with 
the concept itself, though they are not identical. 
In contract law, for example, everyone knows that a signature 
indicates that one is legally bound by a contract’s terms, even though 
conceptually the basis of contract is that one has made a promise, not 
that one has signed a piece of paper. But a signature has become so tied 
to the notion of consent that it has become synonymous with it. One 
might just as readily ask, “was there a signature?” in response to an 
inquiry into whether a contract has been made as “was there a promise?” 
Yet, to further demonstrate how easily agreement might mask 
disagreement, two individuals might in fact disagree about whether a 
signature is synonymous with consent (most would not think so, given 
that fraud in the factum vitiates contractual consent, even with a 
signature), or is only evidence of consent, or is a legally sufficient act to 
make a binding contract even if it is not consent at all and it is known 
that it is not. Though in the vast majority of cases, individuals with these 
three highly divergent views about the criteria for contract formation 
might agree on the outcome of a case or what the law requires given a 
certain set of facts; nonetheless, they actually disagree fundamentally 
about what the law is—i.e., what makes a contract enforceable and why. 
3. Theoretical Agreement
Theoretical agreement is the conceptual obverse of criterial 
agreement—rather than attempting to determine the meaning of a 
concept by recourse to criteria that might give shape to its contours, we 
reason from the category of which the concept is thought to be a 
member.143 Most often, theoretical agreement is witnessed in the form of 
142.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 1778. 
 143.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 
1760 (1995) (“There is often good reason for judges to raise the level of abstraction and ultimately 
to resort to large-scale theory. As a practical matter, discrete judgments about particular cases will 
often prove inadequate. Sometimes, people do not have clear intuitions about how cases should 
come out. Sometimes, seemingly similar cases provoke different reactions, and it is necessary to 
raise the level of theoretical ambition to explain whether those different reactions are justified or to 
show that the seemingly similar cases are different after all. Sometimes, different people simply 
disagree. By looking at broader principles, we may be able to mediate the disagreement. In any 
case, there is a problem of explaining our considered judgments about particular cases – to make 
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reason giving, and it is a powerful means of agreeing (or disagreeing) 
because it elevates the generality of agreement and disagreement.144 
Theoretical agreement is then a kind of agreement about a more general 
concept from which the meaning of the concept under consideration can 
be deduced by virtue of its relationship to or with it. Principles, shared 
fundamental norms and values: these are types of theoretical agreements 
we might have. Theoretical agreement is still not agreement about the 
specific concept at issue, but if there is generalized agreement about how 
to reason from more general concepts to more specific ones, then 
theoretical agreements can fill gaps without requiring particular 
agreement. 
For example, in a dispute over whether an individual should have a 
right to counsel in a civil contempt proceeding, two individuals might 
argue about what it is that makes a right to counsel necessary in any 
given adversary proceeding. One might argue that it is the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee that an individual be provided counsel, and that 
without that specific commitment, there would not even be a right to 
counsel in criminal cases. Another might argue that it is the Fifth 
Amendment’s right to due process of law that undergirds the right to 
counsel and that, even if the Sixth Amendment did not exist, there would 
be a fundamental right to be represented by counsel in any adversary 
proceeding in which a person’s liberty was at stake. In determining the 
scope of the right to counsel, these two individuals would not be arguing 
with one another about the concept of the right to counsel, but rather 
about the theory that gives rise to it, and the category of which it is 
thought to be a part. 
Theoretical agreement is by no means necessary to come to 
agreement about the meaning of a concept. Two individuals might 
disagree on the theory that gives rise to the right to counsel—one might 
think that the right is rooted in the specific textual dictates of the Sixth 
Amendment and another in the dictates of fundamental fairness—but 
both might still agree that counsel is or is not warranted in a broad 
sure that they are not just an accident – and at some point, the law may well want to offer that 
explanation. Ambitious thinkers might therefore urge that low-level principles may conflict with 
one another or be demonstrably wrong. In these circumstances, judges might well resort to higher 
theory.”) 
 144.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 231 (2004) 
(“Reason-giving is a pervasive and frequently praised feature of legal decision-making, and a legal 
decision-maker who provides reasons for her decisions is considered a better legal decision-maker 
than one who does not.”); Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1738 (explaining that “[i]t is customary to 
lament an outcome that has not been completely theorized, on the ground that any such outcome has 
been inadequately justified.”). 
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number of adversarial cases where the stakes are low enough that neither 
theory dictates there be counsel, or the stakes are high enough that both 
theories give rise to such a right (one might imagine a kind of juvenile 
delinquency hearing so nearly criminal in its nature, for example, that it 
still gives rise to a Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Even though they 
lack theoretical agreement, these two individuals nonetheless can come 
to a consensus about what the law is in innumerable cases. 
4. Incompletely Theorized Agreement
The final kind of agreement that will be presented in this brief 
sketch of the landscape of normative interpretive agreements (perhaps 
the most important kind) is incompletely theorized agreement.145 On its 
face, incompletely theorized agreement is not really agreement at all. It 
is really agreement about how to disagree. When faced with a truly 
intractable disagreement about a particular contested proposition, those 
in search of incompletely theorized agreement will move to levels of 
greater and greater particularity in search of agreement.146 They are 
“agreements without theory” dependent on recourse to “rules and 
analogies.”147 As such, incompletely theorized agreements are actually 
brokered agreements.148 Nonetheless, they produce what appears to be 
consensus, namely consensus on outcomes, and therefore play an 
extremely important role in interpretive disputes of all kinds. 
These types of agreements are brokered in the sense that they are a 
product of true compromise, and do not necessarily reflect anything we 
would ordinarily regard as agreement about a contested concept or 
proposition. Settlements in private law, where an individual or entity 
agrees to pay a sum certain rather than bear the risk of litigation, is an 
example of this phenomenon in action. Here, the law specifically 
provides a mechanism for negotiating over a legal proposition without 
resolving anything about its merits. Multimember courts also frequently 
craft decisions and opinions in which it is the case that there may not 
have been consensus regarding many of the statements concerning what 
the law is or what it requires in the majority opinion. Once imprinted in 
a judicial opinion (a conventional source of law), a proposition can 
become law though literally no individual lawyer or judge ever came to 
 145.  Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1735-36; see Cass R. Sunstein, Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values at Harvard Univ.: Political Conflict and Legal Agreement 138, 141 (Nov. 29 – Dec. 1, 
1994), available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/Sunstein96.pdf. 
146.  Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1736. 
147.  Id. at 1739, 1743. 
148.  See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 22, at 969-72. 
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agreement about it. In this way, law can bubble up from the aether, 
without agreement of any kind whatsoever. 
There can be no doubt that agreement to disagree is an important 
kind of agreement, and it is a key task of the legal system to be able to 
handle situations in which agreement cannot be reached. Yet, it is hard 
not to see the decision to compromise—to decide there is no sense in 
continuing to seek consensus on the meaning of a contested concept—as 
a fundamentally normative decision. Indeed, of the kinds of agreement, 
it is perhaps the kind that most openly acknowledges its explicitly merit-
based character, accounting for the idea that two individuals operating in 
good faith can fundamentally disagree about what the law requires so 
substantially that they will never come to consensus in any reasonable 
amount of time. 
5. The Limits of Extensional and Intensional Agreement
To take account: beginning first with existential agreement about 
law, it is probably not the case that there exists massive agreement about 
what laws there are. Moving next to semantic content and legal content 
agreement, it seemed more plausible that claims to massive agreement 
were really meant to cover that territory. But it was also clear that mere 
semantic content agreement was not enough to create widespread 
pervasive agreement about law, and even with the addition of legal 
content agreement to fill gaps, it was easy to imagine innumerable cases 
where social practices themselves would be insufficient to make most 
cases easy. Moving to extensional and intensional agreement, it was 
apparent that there exist innumerable kinds of such agreement—since 
they are really forms of normative argument, rather than true 
agreement—but it was posited that it could be the case nonetheless that 
massive agreement about the law is meant to encompass widespread 
agreement even about the proper resolution of these normative 
arguments. If that last proposition were true—and we not only 
experienced widespread semantic and legal content agreement but also 
massive agreement about how to extend concepts when there is no 
content agreement—would that be what is meant by the claim that there 
is widespread agreement about what the law is? 
Probably not. As Justice Holmes once put it, “general propositions 
do not decide concrete cases.”149 There is an entire social practice that 
has been hanging over this discussion—which is that in the American 
149.  Hart, supra note 94, at 614. 
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system of law at least, the primary legal interpreters are judges and the 
primary method of expounding the law is through cases. In our entire 
discussion of legal agreement, we have barely touched on judges and the 
cases they decide. Yet, the reality that law is bound up with adjudication 
is integral to the claim that there is widespread agreement about what the 
law is.150 
E. Agreement About Decisions 
One cannot talk about massive agreement about the law without 
mentioning the most important situs of legal disagreement—the legal 
case. Whether the kinds of agreement we care about are ultimately 
lensed through discussion of semantic and legal content, or other forms 
of agreement, a prediction about how a case will be decided was the 
centerpiece of arguments about law for centuries. The possibility that we 
might be talking about what a judge will do in fact when we talk about 
what “the law” is has a history in American law dating back to the 
writings of Justice Holmes,151 to those of the Legal Realists and Hartian 
Positivists,152 and onto contemporary debates over the concept and 
nature of law.153 This debate has become more sophisticated as the 
century has progressed, and most lawyers and scholars speaking 
technically no longer believe that the legal case should be the primary 
locus of debate about what determines what the law is—especially if the 
question is legal agreement.154 Nonetheless, this section will cover it 
 150.  After all, those who make the claim that there is widespread agreement immediately tie 
the claim to agreement about cases. See, e.g., Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra 
note 7, at 1227 (“[I]f there were not massive convergence about what the law is, we should expect 
the universe of legal cases to look less like a pyramid and more like a lopsided square, whose base 
was perhaps somewhat bigger than its top.”); Schauer, supra note 8, at 413 (“Following the law is a 
legal event, and the vast majority of these legal events are easy cases.”). 
151.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897). 
152.  HART, supra note 33, at 137. 
153.  See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial 
Comparison, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1, 37 
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“[Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire] is not so much an explanation of the 
law as a sustained argument about how courts, especially American and British courts, should 
decide cases. It contains a theory of adjudication rather than a theory of (the nature of) law. 
Dworkin’s failure to allow that the two are not the same is one reason for the failure of his 
conception of the tasks and method of jurisprudence.”). 
 154.  See Frederick Schauer, (Re)taking Hart, 119 HARV. L. REV. 852, 874-76 & nn.74-81 
(2006) (reviewing NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE 
DREAM (2004)) (presenting the arguments explaining why the method by which a legal system 
performs adjudication is irrelevant to Legal Positivism’s core claims; many theorists hold that Legal 
Positivism is agnostic as to how legal cases are decided as long as the Rule of Recognition “is a 
product of contingent human decision, a social fact, rather than . . . a necessary feature of any legal 
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briefly. 
Justice Holmes enunciated the hypothetical of a bad man whose 
only concern was with legal sanction, and took him as the ultimate test 
of what we mean by law. According to Holmes, “if we take the view of 
our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws” 
for legal reason, justification, principles, or rules.155 He wants only to 
“know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in 
fact.”156 Confessed Holmes, “I am much of his mind. The prophecies of 
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I 
mean by the law.”157 Justice Holmes’ aphorism became the rallying cry 
of Legal Realism—since the imposition of legal sanction by a court is 
frequently the most profound result of writing down the laws. 
But law would mean very little if it only commanded then 
threatened sanction for non-compliance. It would mean even less if all it 
entailed was our predictions about what we could be punished for doing. 
We would need considerably more judges and police if all that kept the 
populace from breaking the law was the fear that we could be punished 
for doing so. There is something frayed about predicting what courts will 
do in fact and calling it the law. Hart called it a “threadbare” 
conception.158 The idea that law is the combination of command and 
sanction “if you take these notions at all precisely, is like that of a 
gunman saying to his victim, ‘Give me your money or your life.’” If law 
were defined by its capacity to inflict punishment, it would have no 
greater claim to legitimacy than an ordinary threat, and the decision to 
comply with the law would be no different from a decision to comply 
with a threat. According to Hart, “Law surely is not the gunman situation 
writ large, and legal order is surely not to be thus simply identified with 
compulsion.”159 
One reason that it is not useful to talk about how cases will be 
decided is that so few “legal events”—events in the world where law 
bears on what might happen—will ever get within a country mile of a 
courthouse.160 Individuals comply with the law regularly, even when no 
one is around to enforce it. We frequently follow the law because it is 
system.”). 
155.  Holmes, supra note 151, at 457. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. at 460-61. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Hart, supra note 94, at 603. 
160.  See Schauer, supra note 8, at 413-14 (adopting the “legal event” terminology to describe 
“the divergence between the behavior that would have occurred but for the law and the behavior 
that occurred because of the law”). 
35
Tutt: Legal Agreement
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
250 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:215 
the law and for no other reason. By the same token, the law is broken 
constantly, sometimes in view of the police, often without fear of 
sanction. We frequently double-park, trespass, jaywalk, spit, littler, 
speed, and loiter without fear. Even in fraught situations in which the 
police are involved or legally operative materials are in play, the notion 
that a court will become involved—that lawyers will become involved—
is remote. We promise, injure, harass, intrude, convert, and trespass with 
far greater fear of social sanction than any legal sanction by a judge 
somewhere in a faraway courtroom. Life is too short. Yet, law still 
operates. Law has the power to guide conduct even when it can never be 
enforced by a judge, and by the same token, some laws do not guide 
conduct even when they could. 
Another reason it is not useful to talk about how cases will be 
decided is that, for all we like to say about it, there is a distinction we 
each can draw about cases on the law and cases on the votes. 
Collegiality and civility—not to mention politics—enter into the 
consideration of actual cases, though many of us think that they should 
not.161 Many law professors believed that the Affordable Care Act would 
be held to be constitutional—that the case was an “easy” one on the law 
governing the Commerce Clause.162 Instead, the case was lost 5-4.163 A 
social movement emanating from partisan political structures created the 
ideological conditions necessary to allow the Supreme Court to make 
this decision.164 Many law professors would have been quick to tell you 
 161.  Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1759 (“Dworkin’s patient and resourceful judge—could not 
really participate in ordinary judicial deliberations. He would probably be seen as a usurper, even an 
oddball. On a single-judge court, he would suffer from the vice of hubris. On a multimember panel, 
he would lack some of the crucial virtues of a participant in legal deliberation. These virtues include 
collegiality and civility, which incline judges toward the lowest level of abstraction necessary to 
decide a case.”) 
 162.  See David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against 
PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 807 (2014) (“Virtually all law professors . . . agreed that all of 
the constitutional challenges to PPACA were meritless—and the federal courts would make short 
work of the litigation. Indeed, as Professor Aziz Huq (University of Chicago) observed, ‘[a]mong 
constitutional scholars, the puzzle is not how the federal government can defend the new law, but 
why anyone thinks a constitutional challenge is even worth making.’ In 2009, Professor Jack Balkin 
(Yale University) similarly observed that ‘the idea that the Act’s mandate to purchase health 
insurance might be unconstitutional was, in the view of most legal professionals and academics, 
simply crazy.’ Professor Akhil Amar (Yale University) declared that based on his three decades of 
studying the Constitution, PPACA ‘easily passes constitutional muster.’”). 
163.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (U.S. 2012). 
164.  See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge 
Went Mainstream, ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-
mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040 (“Was there a magic moment when the challenge to 
the mandate moved from off the wall to on the wall? There are many possible candidates. But the 
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that it was only because of this shift in the social conditions surrounding 
the case that the Justices felt the freedom to vote the way that they did, 
and that the decision was inconsistent with nearly two centuries of 
American constitutional law.165 Some cases that were in no way easy—
Brown v. Board of Education or United States v. Nixon—went 9-0 
because “a complex array of institutional and political considerations 
made it important that there be no dissenters in either case.”166 The early 
Supreme Court, and indeed the modern Supreme Court at various times, 
has discouraged the airing of dissents and concurrences in order to 
strengthen the institution of the Court even at the expense of false 
certainty over the ease of decisions about the law.167 
Moreover, in a scenario in which panels are multi-member, there is 
the possibility that the opinion represents no single person’s 
understanding of the law. There may literally be no individual human 
being in the world who agrees with the majority opinion in toto, but 
because of the compromises necessary to secure a majority, the law is 
established as it is. There “may also be complex bargaining issues as 
some officials or judges seek to implement a broad theory as part of the 
outcome, while others seek a narrow theory, and still others are 
undecided between the two.”168 
A final reason it may not be useful to talk about cases is the 
outcomes of cases are frequently over-determined. Multiple intersecting 
legal rules mean that there is no conceivable path from point A to point 
most important ingredient was the overwhelming support of the Republican Party and its associated 
institutions for the challenge.”). 
165.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Showdown: A Florida Judge Distorted The Law in 
Striking Down Healthcare Reform, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/06/opinion/la-oe-amar-health-care-legal-20110206 (“I strive to 
be apolitical in evaluating students and judges alike. Over the years, many of my favorite students 
have been proud conservatives, while others have been flaming liberals. The Constitution belongs to 
neither party.”). 
166.  See Schauer, supra note 8, at 414-20. 
 167.  See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 432 (1986) 
(“[U]nanimity underscores the gravity of a constitutional imperative—witness Brown v. Board of 
Education and Cooper v. Aaron.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in A Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1185, 1189-91 (1992) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall instituted the practice of 
issuing opinions for the Court as a method of strengthening the Supreme Court as an institution, and 
praising the practice); G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 
VA. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1984) (explaining various ways in which the Marshall Court’s “opinion of the 
Court” practice gave a “false impression of unanimity”); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 169, 171 (Paul L. 
Ford ed., 1899) (criticizing Chief Justice Marshall for suppressing dissents and lending a false sense 
of unanimity to the decisions of the Supreme Court). 
168.  Sunstein, supra note 143, at 1737 n.11 (noting the possibility of this phenomenon and the 
need for further study). 
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Z, regardless of whether somewhere along that path a clearly defined 
legal entitlement was plainly violated.169 Structuring claims around the 
tort of negligence comes to mind. An individual can be negligent but 
cause no harm, for instance, and therefore no tort action is ever brought. 
No claim is ever adjudicated, but one can still say that she acted 
negligently nonetheless. Claims against government officials who have 
the power to invoke qualified and sovereign immunity in their defense 
have a similar quality. There may be no liability, and therefore no 
possibility of a lawsuit, even if there was a clear violation of a legal 
duty. Class action certification incorporates the merits of the underlying 
claim at several stages in the very act of pursuing the vehicle of the class 
action—there must be standing, jurisdiction, numerosity, typicality, 
commonality, adequacy, often also predominance and superiority, yet 
the class action device is the only way in which the claim will ever arise 
in a court because of exogenous economic, social, political, and 
institutional considerations. 
Nonetheless, all of us, in our less sophisticated moments, use the 
shorthand of the judge sitting in judgment in a concrete legal dispute as 
our paradigm instance of a determination of legal meaning. Rightly or 
wrongly, it is probably the case that even if scholars know better, 
educated lay people and even smart lawyers often think that when it is 
asserted there is massive agreement about what the law is, what is meant 
is that there is massive agreement about what the judges will do. But as 
this section has sought to show, this is a problematic way to think about 
legal agreement. 
F. Agreement About Propositions of Law and Legal Propositions 
There is a final kind of legal agreement that must be discussed: the 
notion that what is meant by massive agreement could be massive 
agreement about legal propositions. Agreement about a legal proposition 
is not the same as agreement about what the law says or even what it 
means. Dworkin treated propositions of law as the foundation of his 
 169.  See, e.g., Solum, supra note 36, at 462, 494-95 (“[I]t is pure nonsense to say that legal 
doctrine is completely indeterminate even with respect to very hard cases. Even in the hardest hard 
case, legal doctrine limits the court’s options. One of the parties will receive a judgment, not some 
unexpected stranger; the relief will be related to the dispute at hand and will not be a declaration 
that Mickey Mouse is the President of the United States. . . . the reason that easiest cases are not 
‘cases’ at all is that the law’s relative determinacy does not permit us to make a ‘case’ out of them. 
The very determinacy of the law prevents us from even recognizing them as cases in any grand 
empirical study to determine the percentages of hard and easy cases.”). 
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theory of law, and they are a useful way of thinking about law.170 
According to Dworkin, propositions of law are “all the various 
statements and claims people make about what the law allows or 
prohibits or entitles them to have.”171 Propositions of law are thus 
composites. They can be quite general, as Dworkin noted, they can be 
mere recitations of statutory text. But they can also be quite specific—
incorporating within them specific references to hypothetical facts and 
situations that might arise and the outcomes the law would dictate in 
those situations. According to Dworkin, it is just as much a legal 
proposition to state that “the law forbids states to deny anyone equal 
protection within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment” as it is to 
say “the law does not provide compensation for fellow-servant injuries” 
or “the law requires Acme Corporation to compensate John Smith for 
the injury he suffered in its employ last February.”172 
1. Agreement About What the Law Prohibits One From Doing,
Making, or Having
Thus, the claim to massive agreement could be a claim about how 
to decide the truth of legal propositions, rather than about how to decide 
what the law is. It is a determination of what the law does or does not 
entitle, prohibit, or allow. 
Of all the forms of agreement about the law that we might have, 
this appears to be the most natural. It is agreement about the answers to 
discrete propositional statements as opposed to empirical questions 
about what the law says or is. The distinction is an important one. If 
someone asks the question, “is murder illegal in the jurisdiction?” or “is 
it illegal to kill?”, the answer will surely be yes in every jurisdiction 
worth living in. But framed as a legal proposition, the inquiry becomes 
both more concrete and more useful. “Does an individual have a right to 
kill his attacker if there is no opportunity to retreat and he reasonably 
fears for his life” might be the question, in which case the answer might 
be “yes,” even though that proposition does not recite a “law” written 
down anywhere dictating that result. That method of thinking about legal 
agreement has much more of the texture of actual legal discussion, 
applying law to fact, than the barren question, “what is the law?”173 
170.  DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 4. 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. 
173.  See also, e.g., Moore, supra note 138, at 280 n.6 (arguing that legal propositions are an 
“idiosyncratic way[] of looking at law” because an “idea of law [that] focuses on those singular 
propositions of law that decide particular cases (‘This contract is valid,’ for example)” fails “[t]o 
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2. Agreement About What One is In Fact Prohibited From Doing,
Making, or Having
A final kind of massive agreement we may share may not just be 
about propositions of law in the abstract, but about how the law operates 
in fact. While this form of legal agreement is probably widely shared, it 
is often difficult for the legal system to confront. Frequently, we 
massively agree both about the answer to a proposition of law as a 
formal language game, but also agree as to how the proposition actually 
operates in fact. This second element is important because the legal 
system could be considered manifestly and systematically unjust to the 
extent we thought individuals and judges were systematically unaware 
of how it operated in fact.174 
This distinction between legal propositions in the abstract and legal 
propositions in fact is sometimes known as the distinction between 
concepts and conceptions,175 as under-enforced norms,176 or as the 
distinction between operative rules and decision rules.177 It is the idea 
that the law says one thing, but everyone knows it is a fiction. It is 
something like the notion that “[t]he law in its majestic equality forbids 
the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, 
and to steal bread”178 and opposite the famous statement that “[i]t is a 
settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must 
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”179 Often there are 
rights that have no remedies, and formal equality is substantively 
unequal. 
This dividing line is actually far more important than one might 
initially imagine. The law makes no explicit exception to the speed limit 
for speeding to get one’s wife to the hospital. No formal rule says that 
jaywalking is permissible on an empty traffic-less street. Technically, 
police may stop anyone who violates even the most minimal traffic 
distinguish law from interpretation”). 
 174.  See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (arguing that rights and remedies should be viewed as intimately linked). 
175.  DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 134-35. 
 176.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
56, 152 (1997); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: 
State Courts and the Strategic Space Between Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 959, 961-73 (1985). 
177.  Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2004). 
178.  ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (1894), reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 586 (Justin Kaplan ed., 17th ed. 2002). 
179.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). 
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law,180 and ask anyone at all if they will consent to a search no matter 
what they are up to.181 Officially, students have sweeping rights to speak 
freely in school,182 though everyone knows that in reality they do not.183 
Law and legal propositions weave a complex and interdependent 
fabric with other conventional and normative activities.184 They are not 
cleanly segregable. As such, one way we might agree about what the law 
is might be that we agree that the law creates and sustains certain social 
facts, interactions, hierarchies, and structures. We might say that it 
promises equal protection of the laws, but delivers something less—and 
that this is something we massively agree about. 
IV. LEGAL AGREEMENT AND POSITIVISM’S CLAIMS TO THEORETICAL
SUPERIORITY 
As Part III sought to show, the claim that “there is massive and 
pervasive agreement about the law throughout the system” opens for 
discussion the remarkably rich variety of ways that we might understand 
the nature of legal agreement and disagreement. But now that the 
varieties of legal agreement have been laid bare, it is possible to return to 
the fundamental reason for this Article, which is the remarkably 
persistent claim that the existence of massive agreement makes 
Positivism more plausible than competing accounts of the nature of law; 
that differing theories of the concept of law must make “extravagant” 
claims to achieve the coincidental outcome—massive agreement—that 
Positivism comfortably predicts (and that Positivists regard as a 
constitutive feature of mature legal systems). 
In canvassing the possible meanings of agreement, however, we 
have also seen the possible forms of disagreement. Those forms of 
agreement and disagreement reveal that claims of Positivism’s superior 
descriptive accuracy of the concept of law are overstated, that Positivism 
struggles to account for forms of disagreement that most individuals 
would consider distinctly “legal” even though they cannot be traced to 
180.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
181.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973). 
182.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly 
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 183.  See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 973-76 
(1995) (schools teach citizenship and obedience to authority). 
 184.  See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 122, at 1784 (“[A]lthough the language game of 
constitutional argument is different from the language game of politics or that of morality, the three 
language games (and indeed possibly others) are interpenetrating. They are not identical, but they 
have linkages and allegiances that cannot be fully and finally distinguished and separated.”). 
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conventionality or a “rule of recognition.” 
A. Massive Agreement and Positivism’s Supposed Descriptive 
Superiority 
The argument for Legal Positivism’s claims to descriptive 
superiority over other accounts of the concept of law are that it better 
explains why there is massive agreement.185 That is, a legal proposition’s 
truth or falsity, in Legal Positivism, is defined as whether there is 
agreement among legal officials about it.186 In Natural Law, a legal 
proposition’s truth would be defined by its consistency with 
transcendental reason, and in Dworkinism by the degree to which one or 
another outcome of the proposition would best fit and justify the legal 
system as a whole, casting it in its best light.187 These latter two theories 
of law do not require legal agreement by anyone to establish the veracity 
of legal claims—they appeal to other sources.188 
But it is not readily apparent why Legal Positivism’s prediction that 
there exists massive agreement among officials about the content of law 
should have any relationship whatsoever with our expectations regarding 
agreement about the law among the general public. Indeed, most people 
admittedly do not know the uniquely legal grammar necessary to even 
make sense of legal content agreement among officials and practicing 
attorneys. Yet, individuals manage to stop at stop signs, avoid 
committing trespass or murder, fill out draft forms, obtain driver’s 
licenses, sign leases, and pay their taxes capably with minimal 
knowledge of the specialized legal grammar that forms the unique 
conventionality that decides concrete cases. Perhaps this is because 
semantic content agreement is sufficient to fill the entire gap. However, 
even in Legal Positivism, semantic content agreement is merely a tool of 
 185.  See, e.g., Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1247-49; sources 
cited supra note 7. 
 186.  See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 290 (“The idea that the criteria of legality are 
determined by consensus is not just one aspect of legal practice among many; on current accounts of 
legal positivism, it is the fundamental ground rule of law. What ultimately makes it the case that 
some rule is a binding legal rule is that it is validated by some standard accepted by officials of the 
group.”); sources cited supra note 18. 
 187.  See DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 228-38; see also Silas Wasserstrom, The Empire’s New 
Clothes, 75 GEO. L.J. 199, 274-75 (1986) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986)) 
(describing Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation). 
 188.  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 166 (“Dworkin rejects conventionalism of all kinds 
and at every turn.”); DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 138 (“[N]othing need be settled as a matter of 
convention in order for a legal system not only to exist but flourish.”); Moore, supra note 138, at 
291-96 & n.25. 
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agreement, not a source of agreement. Legal Positivism makes use of 
language conventions to advance and instantiate legal conventions, not 
vice versa. As such, widespread semantic content agreement does 
nothing to make Legal Positivism more plausible at all—whether law is 
conventional or not conventional, we would still expect the tax forms to 
be written in English rather than French. Reasoning from massive 
agreement about words to massive agreement about the law is reasoning 
backward. 
The other possibility is that the law is more certain for officials in 
Legal Positivism because it is conventional. Therefore, law is more 
certain for everyone because it is more certain for officials. As such, 
predictions—either about cases or about legal propositions—are 
somehow likely to be more certain because law is conventional and not 
some other way. 
That implicates the greatest flaw in the reasoning of those who hold 
out the notion of easy cases or massive agreement as reason to prefer 
Legal Positivism. There is little reason to expect that Natural Law, Legal 
Realism, or Dworkinism would give rise to any less certainty about the 
law than law as a purely conventional social practice. 
First, to the extent that Natural Law incorporates principles that are 
considered by sincere adherents to be time-invariant human universals, it 
would stand to reason that Natural Law would almost perfectly mirror 
the actual morals, attitudes, and laws instantiated by society.189 Most 
likely, Natural Law has little to say about how the tax forms should be 
formatted. Yet, to the extent that it would flatly prohibit murder, torture, 
and rape of its own moment, we find that man-made law reflects those 
prohibitions. Viewed from the internal vantage point of an adherent to 
Natural Law who believes that human beings have the capacity to detect 
and understand the transcendental reasons that give rise to those natural 
duties, one would fully expect that our laws would be closely aligned 
with the dictates of that law.190 
Second, to the extent that Legal Realism stands in for the idea that 
legal materials and legal rules do not constrain legal officials, and that 
they merely use them to justify their decisions post-hoc, we would 
nonetheless still expect to see massive agreement. As an initial matter, 
Legal Realism’s post-hoc justifications are designed by the very fact that 
 189.  See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 960 (1993). 
 190.  See, e.g., Meese & Larkin, supra note 72, at 733-34; Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule 
Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1529, 1531 (2009) (calling the 
Golden Rule “[t]he only standard of duty common to all people.”). 
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they are justifications, to lend the appearance of agreement. Agreement, 
as Legal Realism itself argues, is a cloak to hide the exercise of 
discretion.191 
There is another reason to believe we would see massive agreement 
even in a regime where there existed no legal conventionality. What 
Judge Harold Leventhal once observed about the use of legislative 
history—it’s akin to “looking over a crowd and picking out your 
friends”192—tells us why Legal Realism’s theory of judges and judging 
nonetheless predicts massive agreement. Judges and the politicians who 
appoint them are friends. They share an ideology, often a culture, a 
language, and a way of life. Legal Realism says that legal materials do 
not constrain the decisions of legal officials, but that does not mean that 
they are not constrained.193  We can know quite well how a judge will 
decide an easy case, and how she will use the legal materials at her 
disposal to engage in a post-hoc justification of her preordained 
conclusion, even though those materials were not the reason she came to 
the conclusion that she did. Even though “law” did not decide the case. 
Third, Dworkinism presents the strongest case for massive 
agreement since it explicitly contemplates the incorporation of existing 
sources and legal materials into its unique brand of legal reasoning.194 
Dworkinism treats the law like a chain novel in which each individual 
judge is presented with the task of writing the next chapter, and whose 
goal it is to write the chapter that best fits and justifies all the chapters 
that have come before. It is unclear how or why this method—which 
readily relies on existing legal materials, and incorporates existing 
semantic and legal content agreement in reaching its conclusions—
would not appear almost identical to Legal Positivism in the mine run of 
cases.195 In fact, it would only be in hard cases that one would expect the 
two to be distinguishable. 
Indeed, any theory of law that relies on conventional practices to 
instantiate its norms while only predicting deviations when the existing 
 191.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 3; HART, supra note 33, at 136; Green, supra note 
33, at 1917-18; Newman, supra note 33, at 203. 
 192.  Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). 
 193.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 3; HART, supra note 33, at 136; Green, supra note 
33, at 1917-18; Newman, supra note 33, at 203. 
194.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 228-38. 
 195.  Dworkin himself frequently and readily discussed the interrelationship between 
conventions and his theory of law. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 91 (explaining that we 
encounter the conventions of law ready-made and whole cloth, but that it would be a “mistake . . . to 
think that we identify these institutions through some shared and intellectually satisfying definition 
of what a legal system necessarily is and what institutions necessarily make it up.”). 
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legal superstructure has somehow failed is equally capable of accounting 
for nearly all the kinds of massive agreement we observe.196 This is only 
all the more so when we notice that no account of law that depends on 
the notion that conventional legal materials matter much can make sense 
of the profound ignorance of what laws there are.197 Thus, other theories 
of law are just as capable of accounting for the existence of massive 
agreement as Legal Positivism. In crucial ways, some of these accounts 
do far better jobs of explaining the existence and nature of massive 
agreement. 
To put the point even more finely, Natural Law, Legal Realism, and 
Dworkinism—just like Legal Positivism—predict massive agreement, 
even if they do not require it. They are designed to explain and predict 
the methods of determining, ultimately (or at least most likely, given the 
possible meanings of the notion of legal agreement canvassed in this 
Article), the validity of legal propositions. But none of these theories 
denies—and all explicitly contemplate—that social practices and 
conventions will be used to operationalize and build upon these 
foundations in making law work. As such, whether Natural Law, Legal 
Realism, Legal Positivism, or Dworkinism ultimately create in their own 
image, we would nonetheless expect the projection of their effects—in 
the form of agreement about what particular statutes say, or which 
sources are the most authoritative legal sources—to be nigh 
indistinguishable. As such, the argument from massive agreement should 
not affect our decision to adopt any one of these theories over the others. 
B. Forms of Disagreement and Problems For Positivism 
Even as Positivism does not seem to benefit from careful 
examination of its claims to superiority from massive agreement, inquiry 
into the nature of agreement poses vexing problems for Legal 
Positivism, because extensional and intensional disagreements appear to 
be normative in character—and possibly, if not frequently, moral and 
political. 
 196.  See Frederick Schauer, Is Legality Political?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481, 485 (2011) 
(“[I]t is important to exclude from the category of obedience those actions that are consistent or in 
conformity with the law but which are not taken because of the law.”). It is difficult to understand 
the foregoing statement without presupposing a meaning of law, which makes the statement almost 
unintelligible. See, e.g. COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 167 (“[E]ven a decision reached by applying 
authoritative sources and those to which one is authoritatively directed, and doing so in an 
appropriate or authorized way, need not state the law. That depends on what one’s theory of law 
is.”). 
 197.  That is, what is written in the rules, regulations, statute books, case reports, and the 
Constitution, etc. 
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The examples one could provide are myriad, but most often are 
cleanly presented through questions involving persistent interpretive 
disagreements. When a judge is asked to apply the statute: “No person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” 
much about that statute’s meaning is determinable by its semantic and 
legal content, but those sources of meaning do not exhaust the ways in 
which we might be uncertain about how a legal proposition should be 
decided. As the hypothetical cases presented earlier show, even easy 
cases can be hard. What is a Court to do if the violation is manifest—
torture, beating, and whipping—but there is a procedural defect in 
raising an objection to the admission of the evidence at trial? Can it 
really be the case, as the Positivists suggest, that such an instance is 
either decided readily by convention or decided by discretion, but cannot 
be decided by argument over what the law requires? That it would not be 
“legal” argument to engage in prescriptive disagreement about 
paradigms, criteria, or theory? 
This kind of disagreement is not purely the stuff of appellate courts. 
Indeed, the actors in the legal system who most frequently engage in this 
sort of reasoning about law are probably police officers and prosecutors. 
But these sorts of difficult questions—which involve recourse to reason 
and practical judgment—are still legal questions and the reasoning 
process certainly appears to be a legal one. To the extent that Legal 
Positivism seeks to exclude the inevitable disagreements that arise in 
such situations—fraught and morally freighted as they are—it does so at 
the cost of offering a descriptively adequate account of a frequent 
occurrence that dictates the actual determination of a substantial number 
of propositions of law—whether that disagreement is styled as a 
language game or understood as effecting substantive outcomes in the 
world. 
Legal Positivists would accept that there might be explicit 
normative disagreements about what the law requires in any of the 
myriad easy cases presented earlier in this Article respecting our 
hypothetical statute. As such, they would not necessarily disagree with 
anything that has been said about the nature of agreement or 
disagreement thus far. But to hold to Legal Positivism while accepting 
the inevitability of normative interpretive disagreements is to miss an 
important endogeneity. Legal Positivism says that social conventions 
determine legality. Exclusive Legal Positivism argues that legal validity 
depends solely on sources, not on merits. Inclusive Legal Positivism 
argues that legal validity can depend on the merits of a law, but only if 
our shared legal grammar—the rule of recognition, or what this Article 
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has styled “legal content agreement”—allows for such merits-based 
considerations. 
But when we argue over that shared legal grammar—when we 
argue over the content of the rule of recognition, (for instance, whether 
the six modalities of constitutional argument really are the only six 
legitimate forms of constitutional argument), we create the possibility of 
normative disagreement about the very conventionality that is supposed 
to create and sustain law. This form of disagreement, known as 
theoretical disagreement, remains a serious challenge to Legal 
Positivism,198 and one that can only be answered by arguing that it does 
not really exist. That is, that its face value cannot be preserved.199 
Nevertheless, legal grammar does change, and judges do try to play legal 
grammarian as a way of deciding concrete legal propositions—which 
seems to demand that we take the argument from theoretical 
disagreement at face value and build a theory around it. But if we are to 
take this form of disagreement seriously, it will require us to reevaluate 
Legal Positivism. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article sought to show that the concept of legal agreement is 
itself quite malleable and open to competing interpretations. This 
ambiguity often means that we have little idea what is meant when 
someone argues that there is massive agreement about what the law is or 
that there are many easy cases. Reducing the level of abstraction, we see 
that all forms of agreement, except pre-interpretive forms of “content 
agreement” are really forms of intensional and extensional agreement, 
which involve recourse to normative argument about how a concept 
should be understood. As such, even in easy cases, it will frequently be 
the case that we will not ever completely agree on the meaning of 
concepts and rules involved, even if we reach the same result in their 
application in deciding a particular proposition (in which case agreement 
is often incompletely theorized). 
Furthermore, we would expect to see massive agreement in any 
theory of law that relies on conventional practices to instantiate its 
norms. Since conventional practices are precisely the tools one would 
expect any rational society to employ in operationalizing its law, we 
would expect to see this often. Whether speed limits are ultimately a 
result of transcendental reason or a social rule, we would still expect 
198.  See Andrew Tutt, The Improbability of Positivism, 34 PACE L. REV. 562, 564-66 (2014). 
199.  See Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement, supra note 7, at 1228. 
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massive agreement about the speed limits on the street signs and in the 
statute books. Therefore, the existence of massive agreement, such as it 
is, should play little role in deciding between competing theories of the 
concept of law. 
Finally, because normative disagreement is a pervasive feature of 
interpretation in both language and law, Legal Positivism invites its own 
challenge in making massive agreement claims. In particular, it must 
contend with the fact that even in easy cases, substantive normative 
interpretive challenges can always be marshaled in determining the 
content of concepts, and the sources of those challenges are not limited 
by any social rule. For example, in contests over the concept of a chair, a 
judge is free to make recourse to moral, ethical, and other sources of 
practical reason in deciding the content of the concept. To the extent that 
a Positivist would seek to argue that judges are bound by convention to 
limit the sources to which they might make recourse, that argument is 
itself a normative one that can be contested on its own merits. This 
possibility of infinite regress poses a vexing challenge to the notion that 
law is a purely conventional practice,200 and therefore, to the idea that 
there is or can be a strict separation between law and morality.201 
 200.  See COLEMAN, supra note 26, at 157 (“By modus tollens, if officials can disagree about 
what the criteria are, then the criteria are not a matter of conventional practice.”) 
 201.  Id. at 171 (“The problem is that positivists have no theory of revision. Hart certainly does 
not. He tells us only that to resolve the dispute and in effect therefore to revise the law, the judge 
must exercise discretion.”). 
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